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Bliley Act and Dodd-Frank Act, to what extent do corporate interests influence the lawmaking process in
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The first section of this thesis reviews relevant social science literature on the nature and influence of
interest groups in governance. The next section analyzes the primary methods through which interest
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Introduction

What began as a small “Occupy Wall Street” protest in New York in September of 2011
has expanded into a movement throughout the United States and around the world. These
protestors are criticizing (among other things) a society in which big business and the rich have
disproportionate influence over the middle class and the poor. At the center of this outcry is the
belief that government is working for wealthy special interests rather than for the country as a
whole. This idea is not new. In his 1960 classic, The Semi-Sovereign people: A Realist's View of
Democracy in America, E.E. Schattschneider argued against the pluralistic view that “the people
really do decide what the government does on something like a day-to-day basis,” contending
that the political system is biased in favor of the wealthy and big business interests.1
This political science honors thesis will investigate corporate influence on the lawmaking
process, with an emphasis on financial services legislation. The research question to be explored
is: “As evidenced by the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act and Dodd-Frank Act, to what extent do
corporate interests influence the lawmaking process in absolute and relative terms vis-à-vis their
adversaries (consumer advocates, labor, etc.)?” In assessing the absolute influence of business
groups, this thesis will seek to identify their power in the lawmaking process in relation to
legislators; in identifying their relative power, it will compare them to adversary groups. The
hypothesis of this thesis is that corporate powers have significant but not hegemonic influence in
the legislative process and that they were a strong force behind the shape of Gramm-LeachBliley and, to a lesser extent, Dodd-Frank.
The answer to this question has implications for the U.S. and global economies as well as
for the status of James Madison’s vision for American democracy. The 2007-2008 financial

1

E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America, (New York: Holt,
Reinhart, and Winston, 1960), 130.
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crisis can trace many of its causes to specific government policies and de-regulation. In the
aftermath of the turmoil of 2008, correcting these underlying problems was an important task for
government. An inability to do so because of undue influence in the lawmaking process by
wealthy groups would illustrate a government that saw certain firms not only as “too big to fail”
but “too powerful to regulate,” leaving the global economy vulnerable to another economic
collapse.2 On a more philosophical level, the failure of Congress to fairly weigh competing
interests would reflect poorly on James Madison’s vision of a legislature that could resist the
impact of factions and work for the common good of the nation.
Roadmap for the Thesis
The first section of this thesis is a review of relevant social science literature on the
nature and influence of interest groups in governance. The next section is an analysis of the
primary methods through which interest groups influence government: campaign finance and
lobbying. This section includes information regarding the growth of such activities over time
and the strong advantage business representatives have over unions, public interest groups, and
consumer advocates. The third portion includes the two case studies: the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act and Dodd-Frank financial regulatory reform. These two case studies illustrate the strong
power of business interest groups in the legislative process, while also demonstrating the
continuing ability of consumer advocates to influence key policies.

2

The latter of these two terms was created by Professor John DiIulio.
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Part I: Literature Review

Interest Group Theory
There has been significant attention paid to groups and factions throughout American
history. Norm Ornstein and Shirley Elder argue that theories about groups have centered around
three questions: Are groups inherently good or bad? Do groups approximate the public interest
or undermine it? Do interest groups represent numerous segments of society or are they
weighted to the upper class and business?3 Since the founding of the United States, thinking
about interest groups has morphed into several schools of thought.
Madison and Interest Groups:
In the Federalist Papers, particularly numbers 10 and 51, James Madison expresses the
view that factions are inherently bad and often work against the rights of others and the interests
of the community. He defines such groups as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community.”4 Madison feared the influence of factions in the new republic. He
believed that factions result from the flawed nature of humanity: “If men were angels, no
government would be necessary…you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”5 Thus, a major purpose of the Constitution

3

Norman Ornstein and Shirley Elder, Interest Groups, Lobbying and Policymaking, (Washington: Congressional
Quarterly Press, 1978), 7-8.
4
James Madison, “Federalist No. 10.”
5
James Madison, “Federalist No. 51.”
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would be to deal with the negative aspects of human nature and the manifestation of those traits
in factions.
Madison argues that there are two ways to mitigate the effects of such groups: to remove
the cause by constricting liberty or “by controlling its effects.”6 Madison claims that the process
of destroying liberty to prevent factions is “worse than the disease” and that the Constitution
should thus seek to mitigate their negative effects.7 He posits that a large and diverse republic
would control the effects of factions by containing such a large number of such groups that it
would be difficult for one to gain hegemony. The system of checks and balances and divided
powers would further discourage the consolidation of power by one or more groups. The
Constitution would limit the power of individual factions and prevent tyranny of the majority.
Therefore, to Madison, factions are an inevitable and unfortunate outcome of Man’s flawed
nature; the Constitution should endeavor to control them and limit the effects of humanity’s
worst impulses, but must not forcibly eradicate liberty in order to do so.
John C. Calhoun, Interest Groups, and the Existence of the “Public Interest”
In the 1840s, South Carolina Senator John C. Calhoun rejected James Madison’s notion
of interest groups in his theory of “the concurrent majority.” As opposed to Madison, Calhoun
did not believe that interest groups were inherently selfish; instead, he appreciated them for their
varying viewpoints. However, he did agree with the founding father that American society was
destined to have a diverse set of organizations and viewpoints and that there was a danger of
“tyranny of the majority.” Calhoun believed that each of the interest groups in the country
should have the power to veto any major policy that affected them. Only in the case in which
there existed a “concurrent majority” of all interest groups in supporting that policy would it be

6
7

Madison, “Federalist No. 10.”
Ibid.
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able to be adopted.8 One can clearly see an argument for the preservation of slavery and right of
states and localities to nullify anti-slavery legislation in Calhoun’s argument. That being said, he
did raise an interesting point about the nature of the “public interest.” While Madison believed
that there existed a broad public interest, Calhoun rejected this notion, claiming that the so-called
community interest is nothing other than the independent interests of one or more factions.
This last point is an important distinction, and one that applies to current discussions of
special interest groups vs. public interest organizations. Calhoun’s argument applies to the
question “whose interest is special?” In his book Government’s End, Jonathan Rauch argues that
many community interest organizations, such as environmental groups, peace advocates, and
consumer groups, are not simply trying to benefit society as a whole, but have self-serving
agendas. For example, many of the largest environmental organizations are multimillion-dollar
corporations. In 1997, the National Wildlife Federation generated more than $80 million in
revenue and paid its president more than $300,000.9 Ostensibly, public interest groups are just as
interested in transferring public resources towards causes they value as business groups. For
example, environmentalist groups might care more about preserving forest environments than
about producing more affordable timber through logging, which is an alternate outcome that may
be more valued by homebuyers and the rest of society.10 In sum, the arguments John C. Calhoun
proposed in the 1840s, ostensibly to support slavery, have important and lasting implications for
the conception of the public interest.

8

John C. Calhoun, “A Disquisition on Government,” in Source Book of American Political Theory, Benjamin F.
Wright, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1929).
Also see Ornstein and Elder, 10-11.
9
Jonathan Rauch, Government’s End: Why Washington Stopped Working, (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 4748.
10
Ibid., 48-49.
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The Bentley-Truman Theory of Interest Groups

At the turn of the twentieth century, the discipline of political science entered the debate
over interest groups in American politics. In 1908, Arthur Bentley published The Process of
Government, arguing that government and policy reflected that interactions of interest groups
inside and outside of the government: “We shall have to get hold of political institutions,
legislatures, courts, executive officers, and get them stated as groups, and in terms of groups.”11
This pluralistic view of politics emphasizes that the only thing one needs to do to understand the
nature of the various groups in society is to observe their stances and actions: “society, itself, is
nothing other than the complex of the groups that compose it.”12
Bentley’s conception of politics was largely ignored for several decades, but in 1951,
David B. Truman picked up on this strain of thought in his book The Government Process. In
this work, Truman perceives individuals in light of their group identifications. He cites the
tendency of people to join multiple groups, each of which has different goals and methods,
ultimately mitigating the “mischiefs of faction.”13 Together, interest groups form a mosaic “of
various specialized sorts” that makes up society.14 Truman did not have as negative a view of
interest groups as James Madison; instead, he saw them as “a necessary and vital component of
the democratic governmental process.”15 According to political scientist George McKenna,
Truman and other pluralist scholars “were satisfied with ‘consensus’ and ‘mutual adjustment’” of
group interests rather than taking Madison’s more deontological drive towards the value of
“justice” in government.16

11

Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government, (San Antonio: Principia Press, 1949), 210.
Ibid, 208-209.
13
Ornstein and Elder, 12.
14
David B. Truman, The Government Process, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1958), 43-44.
15
Ornstein and Elder, 12.
16
George McKenna, American Politics: Ideals and Realities, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1976).
12
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Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, many other scholars adopted this positive
disposition towards interest groups. Lester Milbrath’s 1963 book The Washington Lobbyists
discounted the influence of interest group lobbyists: “Lobbyist and lobbying groups have a very
limited ability to control the selection of officials or to affect the likelihood that an official can
keep or enhance his position. They also find it difficult and very expensive to try to manipulate
public opinion.”17 While Milbrath does consent to the argument that interest groups do have
considerable power in politics, he claims that this is due to the power of individual members as
voters, not to the influence of the group. Another important work in this school of thought was
Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee’s 1954 book, Voting, in which the authors argue that the
political system is served well by individuals participating through the mediating force of interest
groups.18 In sum, the Bentley-Truman pluralist school of thought had a positive view of interest
groups in American politics and tended to emphasize the political system as a reflection of the
interaction of these factions.
An Upper Class Bias of Interest Groups
Beginning in the 1930s, E.E. Schattschneider argued that groups achieve disproportionate
influenced based on their resources and “inside connections,” rather than due to other merits.19
His 1935 book, entitled Politics, Pressures and the Tariff, contains the observation that groups
able to buy more experienced and well-connected lobbyists have a leg up in influencing
Congress. Notably, such groups achieve success based not on their membership size, but on
these other monetary factors.20 In his 1960 classic, The Semi-Sovereign People, Schattschneider
claims that one of the most basic functions of government is to control conflict. This conflict

17

Lester Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), 342.
Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, Voting, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).
19
Ornstein and Elder, 14.
20
Ibid.
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plays out prominently in the “pressure system,” defined as “the organized special-interest
groups.”21 He distinguishes between public interests (those that are shared by all or by the vast
majority of members in the community) and special interests (those shared only by a few people
or by a faction that “exclude others and may be adverse to them”).22 In examining the pressure
system, Schattschneider comes to the conclusion that government is overwhelmingly influenced
by the upper class and, especially, by business groups. He cites lists of national associations in
the U.S., which reveal a large concentration of business organizations.23 Indeed, Schattschneider
makes the claim that “the business community is by a wide margin the most highly organized
segment of society.”24 This organization has profound effects: businessmen are four to five
times more likely to be in contact with their representatives than manual laborers.25 He claims
that even outside the business community, organizations tend to be biased towards the upper
classes, as wealthy and educated people tend to be more involved in groups.26
Two other scholars to adopt this view of interest groups were C. Wright Mills and Robert
Paul Wolff. In his 1959 book The Power Elite, Mills claims that a small segment of individuals
in America dominate the economic, political and military spheres of the country. In reference to
group influence, he argues that, “high-level lobbying is…done within the confines of that
elite.”27 In his 1965 essay “Beyond Tolerance,” Robert Paul Wolff criticizes pluralist theories
for failing to take into account the national interest. He claims that interest groups naturally pick
their personalized interests over the public good. Like Schattschneider, Wolff argues that

21

Schattschneider, 29.
Ibid., 23-24.
23
Ibid., 31.
24
Ibid., 30.
25
Ibid., 31
26
Ibid., 33-34.
27
C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 292.
22
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government is not merely the sum of interest group relations, but that there is an objective
national interest superceding these relations.28
Theodore Lowi and Groups Eroding Public Authority
Since the 1960s, many scholars have supported the Schattschneider thesis about relative
interest group power, although some have attributed different root causes to the thesis. In his
1969 book The End of Liberalism, Theodore Lowi criticizes interest groups for another reason.29
He claims that the positive view of interest groups has created a dangerous situation for
American society, one in which “government had lost its basic sense of legitimacy and
authority.”30 Lowi posits that, over time, as the government expanded, it abdicated its
responsibility in determining the direction of public policy to private interests in a process he
called “interest-group liberalism.” This had produced an impotent government that lacked clear
policy goals.31 Lowi criticizes interest-group liberalism for four reasons. First, it “corrupts
democratic government” by confusing the fact that people have access to democratic rights with
the conclusion that they are exercising their rights. In addition, it “renders government
impotent” by delegating power to private enterprises, and thus sacrificing governmental power.
Third, liberal governments demoralize government by failing to achieve justice. Finally,
interest-group liberalism corrupts government by replacing clear and formal procedure with
shadowy informal bargaining.32 Lowi calls his contemporary government the Second Republic,
with the First Republic having ruled through the first part of the twentieth century. In this new
arrangement, interest groups had hijacked the government, forming narrow fiefdoms, in which

28

Robert Paul Wolff, et al., “Beyond Tolerance,” A Critique of Pure Tolerance, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965).
Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969).
30
Ornstein and Elder, 16.
31
Lowi, 287.
32
Ibid., 295-298.
29

Silverman

13

they possess significant power and resisted any attempts to upset the status quo.33 In the Second
Republic’s place, Lowi suggests “juridical democracy,” a system in which the government would
have more authority through defined legislative delegation of authority and more power to make
rules.34 Interestingly, while Lowi critiqued the pluralist/liberal view of interest groups just as
Mills and Schattschneider did, he fell on the opposite side of the political spectrum, landing
closer to conservatives.
Olson and Collective Action
In addition to scholars who have focused on the specific actions taken by groups, others
have emphasized the difficulty of establishing and maintaining groups. In his 1965 book The
Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson focuses on the decision-making process behind
individuals’ decisions about whether to join a particular group. He argues that large interest
groups constitute a collective action problem, in that the costs imposed on individuals by
membership and participation tend to appear greater than any tangible payoff. Olson claims that
individuals have a much higher tendency to join groups when such participation is compulsory or
when the group is small enough that the person sees himself or herself as instrumental to its
success.35 He argues that it is relatively easy to form small organizations, but much more
difficult to build medium or large groups. This theory can easily be applied to interest groups
and government influence. People do not have strong incentives to join public interest groups,
while trade associations only require a small number of firms with strong and specific interests to
exist and thrive. Moreover, the perceived benefits of trade associations generally appear larger
in relation to the cost than a similar comparison with public interest groups. In addition, Olson

33

Rauch, 224.
Ornstein and Elder, 16-17.
35
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Good and The Theory of Groups, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1965).
34
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cites the fact that many trade associations provide the additional benefits of research and
statistics, references on customers, advisory services, etc.36 Thus, pluralism is inaccurate in
asserting that political outcomes will reflect the interests of competing groups: “since large
groups normally will not be able to [act in support of common interests], the outcome of the
political struggle among the various groups in society will not be symmetrical.”37
In his book Government’s End, Jonathan Rauch provides a succinct illustration of
Olson’s theory about private vs. public interests via a fictional organization called C-MOR (The
Coalition to Make Ourselves Rich). The group has the choice of fronting all the lobbying money
for a job-training program that will provide $1 million of benefits to society or a $1 million tax
break focused on its members. In the former option, the group will pay the lobbying costs of
generating the public good, but will receive a small share of the benefits equal to that of the
people who did not contribute to the lobbying effort. On the other hand, if the group pursues the
second option, C-MOR’s members earn a much larger bang for their buck. Likewise, in
American society, interest groups have strong incentives to attempt to gain a greater slice of the
economic pie, rather than try to expand the entire pie. Additionally, they will tend to fight much
harder to keep their special benefits and avoid encroachment than will those organizations that
are acting in the public interest.38 As a result, trade associations tend to be much more equipped
and financially prepared to influence the government than are large, diffuse public interest
groups.
Salisbury and Exchange Theory
Robert Salisbury focused on the incentive frameworks for groups in “Exchange Theory.”
In 1969, he published an article in the Midwest Journal of Political Science, entitled “An
36

Ibid., 145.
Rauch, 25-26.
38
Ibid., 29-30.
37
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Exchange Theory of Interest Groups.”39 In this theory, Salisbury focuses within organizations
on leaders and the various incentive structures available to them. He identifies three types of
incentives: material, solidary (socialization and friendship), and purposive (ideological
satisfaction). According to Salisbury, political organizations tend to rely on purposive and
material incentives. While groups that rely primarily on purposive incentives do not incur high
costs, they are naturally unstable, susceptible to splinter organizations and membership
fluctuations. Salisbury explains: “The benefits derived from value expression are seldom of
great intrinsic worth…a slight change in the member’s resources or social pressures may lead to
his failure to renew his membership.”40 Organizations that rely on purposive incentives risk
losing significant membership if the relevant circumstances change. For example, groups that
support government reform saw their memberships skyrocket and plummet during Watergate
and after Nixon resigned, respectively.41 Quite simply, in the absence of a more complicated
incentive package, organizations relying on purposive rationale are unstable. In contrast, groups
that rely on material (money and jobs) benefits tend to have high start-up costs but be relatively
stable. Once a trade association is established, its members have a strong motivation for
remaining in the group: the association works to improve the financial standing of its members.
A shift in outside circumstances is less likely to hurt material-driven groups. Material-oriented
groups, such as businesses, trade associations, and labor have natural advantages over public
interest and ideologically motivated organizations.

39

Robert H. Salisbury, “An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, (February,
1969), 1-32.
40
Ornstein and Elder, 19.
41
Ibid.
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Interest Groups in Action

Interest groups influence the legislative process through two primary channels: campaign
finance and lobbying. The political science literature paints a picture in which business
organizations have gained a significant financial and organizational edge over consumer
advocates and unions.
How Business Influences Congress: Campaign Finance
The Nature of Campaign Finance:
One of the most commonly cited ways that corporations influence Congress is through
the channel of campaign finance. In his seminal work entitled Congress, David Mayhew cites
the rise over the course of the 20th century of the “career politician.” Due to the lack of power of
political parties in American politics, responsibility for fundraising falls largely on individual
candidates.42 In order to be elected, representatives need money for polling, paying campaign
workers, advertising, renting office space, and other purposes. Monetary resources can often tip
the balance of a close race. Former Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill, Jr. (D-MA) once stated:
“There are four parts to any campaign. The candidate, the issues of the candidate, the campaign
organization, and the money to run the campaign with. Without money you can forget the other
three.”43 Money is important both for managing the campaign and for deterring well-funded
challengers from running.44 Business-oriented groups often provide much of the cash for an
election, greatly augmenting contributions from individuals and political parties.
Over time, the cost of Congressional campaigns has sharply increased: in 1972, the total
spending of all House and Senate campaigns was $62.2 million; in the 2010 cycle, this figure

42

David Mayhew, Congress, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 14-15, 29.
James W. Lamare, What Rules America? (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1988), 106.
44
Mayhew, 41.
43
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rose to nearly $1.1 billion.45 According to the Center for Responsive Politics, in 2010, the
average winning House campaign spent $1,439,997.46 In order to pay the high price tag of a
winning campaign, candidates need to seek additional funding beyond individual contributions.
In 2010, the winning House campaigns raised an average of more than $560,000 from PAC’s;
winning Senate campaigns received nearly $2 million.47 Campaign finance rules allow each
interest group to have a greater monetary impact on a given campaign than may any individual
who contributes. An individual is limited to a maximum contribution of $2,500 per election
cycle, while PAC’s may give $5,000. Moreover, PAC’s can give to as many campaigns as they
want and can bundle contributions from individuals, whereas a single person can give no more
than a total of $46,200 to campaigns.48 Thus, whereas an individual’s influence is limited in
scope, political action committees can build reputations and donate to coalitions of candidates
who reflect their views. Incumbents have a significant advantage in fundraising. This
contributes to the extremely high reelection rate for members seeking reelection. In an average
year, nine out of every ten incumbents who are running can expect to win their races. In no
election between 1998 and 2004 did the House reelection rate dip below 96%.49 Even in the
“anti-incumbent” 2010 cycle, 85% of House members and 84% of Senators regained their
seats.50 An important factor behind the advantage of incumbents is their superior fundraising

45

Ibid.
Also see: Center for Responsive Politics, “Price of Admission,”
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/stats.php?cycle=2010, Accessed March 27, 2012.
46
Center for Responsive Politics, “Election Stats,”
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/elec_stats.php?cycle=2010, Accessed March 27, 2012.
47
Ibid.
48
Federal Election Commission, “Contribution Limits: 2011-2012,”
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml, Accessed March 27, 2012.
49
Center for Responsive Politics, “Reelection Rates Over the Years,”
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.php?cycle=2010, Accessed March 27, 2012.
50
Ibid.
Also see: Lamare, 105.
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with PAC’s. In 2010, most PAC’s gave under 10% of their funds to challengers.51 In total, the
average House incumbent raised more than five times as much money as did the average
challenger in 2010; in the Senate, the gap was even wider.52
PAC’s do not only play an important role in the financing of candidates; they often
recruit and train the very people who run for office. Groups such as EMILY’s List on the left
and the Club for Growth on the right entice potential candidates to run with promises of
campaign contributions and other forms of support. In addition, others, such as the AFL-CIO
and the American Medical Association’s AMPAC, provide favorable polling and strategic advice
to candidates.53
Business interests have a large advantage over labor groups when PAC funding is
analyzed. In a study after the 2002 elections, Paul Herrnson found that corporate PAC’s
outspent labor PAC’s by a nearly two-to-one margin, a figure that did not even take into account
the contributions of trade associations.54 According to The Center for Responsive Politics, in
2010, business PAC’s outspent labor groups by a margin of about three-to-one. When soft
money is analyzed, business groups outspend labor by the whopping margin of seventeen-toone.55 These figures are vastly different from the relative financial clout of business groups and
unions only a few decades ago. In 1976, the first year of public financing of presidential
campaigns, unions out-donated business organizations $8 million to $7 million.56 While

51

Center for Responsive Politics, “PAC Dollars to Incumbents, Challengers, and Open Seat Candidates,”
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/pac2cands.php?cycle=2010, Accessed March 27, 2012.
52
Center for Responsive Politics, “Incumbent Advantage,”
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/incumbs.php?cycle=2010, Accessed March 27, 2012.
53
Paul S. Herrnson, “Interest Groups and Campaigns: The Electoral Connection,” in The Interest Group
Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington, 2nd Ed., Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G.
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candidates may not be able to be directly “bought” by soft money, they might be influenced into
supporting corporate interests in order to avoid negative independent advertising during a
campaign. In 2010, the finance/insurance/real estate industries spent the most money of any
sector, collectively contributing nearly $320 million.57 Therefore, campaign contributions play a
key role in the incumbency advantage enjoyed by members of Congress. Business groups,
particularly the financial services sector, donate much more heavily than labor advocates.
Campaign Finance and Legislative Influence:
Campaign contributions play a key role in determining who gets access to members of
Congress. Interest groups often donate to members of both parties even if their ideologies are
not consistent. For example, in 2010, the finance/insurance/real estate sectors gave 45% of their
PAC donations to Democrats and 50% to Republicans, even though the latter party is generally
more supportive of their interests. Overall, business groups gave 49% to Democrats and 50% to
Republicans.58 Moreover, PAC’s frequently give money to incumbents who are running
unopposed in their general elections. For example, Senator John Thune (R-SD) raised nearly
$2.5 million from PAC’s between 2005 and 2010, even though he held a safe seat and ultimately
faced no Democratic opponent.59 In 2009 and 2010 alone (when it was apparent he would run
unopposed), Thune raised nearly $400,000 from the finance, insurance, and real estate
industries.60 A big reason for these contributions is that organizations view their financial
support as a means of buying access to representatives once they are in power. In 1974, when
Fred Wertheimer, the executive of Common Cause, was asked about his group’s donation to both
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liberals and conservatives, he responded: “the ideology involved is that there is an ideology of
incumbency…the money is an investment.”61 Former RNC Chairman Bill Brock commented
that business groups donating heavily to incumbent Democrats reflected an attempt “to buy
access to Congress.”62 The idea that interest groups view campaign spending as a means to gain
access is bolstered by the trend among PAC’s to donate most heavily to party leaders and
committee chairs. Paul Brewer and Christopher Deering conducted a study on the Republican
House committee chair battles in 2000, finding that the representatives who donated the most of
their own money to the Republican Party and Republican candidates nearly always got the
gavel.63 An implication of this tendency is that money becomes an extremely important
determinant in who assumes leadership positions; as a result, PAC’s need to contribute in order
to aid the ascendancy of representatives and ultimately earn access.
Groups that do not have the resources to form PAC’s run the risk of relative exclusion
from the political process compared to better-funded business organizations. Former Senator
Bob Dole once quipped: “There aren’t any Poor PAC’s or Food Stamp PAC’s or Nutrition
PAC’s or Medicare PAC’s.”64 Paul Herrnson has noted that “many groups, such as the poor and
homeless have no representation in the PAC community…figures on PAC formation and PAC
spending serve to dispel pluralist notions that all societal interests are equally represented…and
have a comparable impact on the financing of Congressional elections.”65 As the less
advantaged do not have the money to gain influence, programs that benefit them may be at
greater risk of cutbacks.
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The political science literature has yet to reach a consensus on the degree to which
campaign contributions affect the legislative process itself. According to Lee Drutman, existing
studies have found the statistical impact on legislative outcomes to be minimal.66 Nevertheless,
it is possible that campaign contributions are still an important distorting factor on Congress.
David Mayhew cites one such example in Congress. In the 1960s, Rep. Torbert H. MacDonald
(D-MA), the Chairman of the House Communications and Power Subcommittee of the Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Committee, was immobilized from introducing legislation regulating the
industries under his jurisdiction after electric companies bankrolled his general election
opponent. One former aide quipped: “Even though Torby easily defeated his opponent, the
experience made him sort of paranoid. He is now reluctant to do anything that would offend the
power people.”67 This story illustrates an important limitation within the existing literature: it is
possible that business organizations have influenced the political process by scaring members of
Congress away from attempts to regulate their industries. Former Representative Millicent
Fenwick (R-NJ) recounts the impact of contributions on votes: “members have told me they
received such-and-such an amount from one of these groups and could not vote with me.”68 In
one small study, Amitai Etzioni tracked a 1982 House Energy Committee vote to curb auto
emission standards, finding that members who voted in favor of the legislation received fivetimes as much money from auto manufacturer PAC’s as did those representatives voting against
the measure.69 Although this is an admittedly small-scale study with other possible explanations
for its results, it does hint at the impact of campaign contributions on the legislative process.
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Interest group relationships with members may strengthen over time, requiring multiple
rounds of contributions for desired legislative results. For example, Thomas Stratmann explored
the relationship between the financial services industry and Congress in the 1980s and the
passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, finding that increases in contributions over time were
correlated with House members switching their votes from no to yes.70 It is possible that
members cannot be “bought” for a onetime contribution, but are more receptive to the interests
of organizations with whom they have an ongoing relationship. Furthermore, in the aftermath of
the Citizen’s United Supreme Court decision, representatives may be even more scared to push
legislation that hurts the interests of corporations and the wealthiest citizens. With the right to
spend unlimited funds on independent expenditures guaranteed, an era of even more influence
may be dawning.
One final consideration in assessing the degree to which campaign contributions
influence the political process is the nature of the issue being considered by Congress. Research
suggests that the more controversial and visible issues tend to be acted upon largely independent
of campaign contributions, as “well-publicized, contentious issues draw many groups,
legislators, and committees into the policy process…PAC’s must compete with a variety of
sources trying to influence legislative voting.”71 On the other hand, in situations in which
committees legislate on narrow interests and in which there exist long-standing relationships
between members and industry advocates, PAC contributions tend to have a greater impact on
voting. Examples of such behavior include defense contractors and the Armed Services
Committee, deregulation of the trucking industry, and the exemption of professionals from FTC
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regulation.72 All this being said, there are still not studies linking PAC contributions as the one
factor leading to votes.73
In sum, one of the primary ways that interest groups, especially business organizations,
attempt to influence the political process is through campaign finance. Campaigns depend
significantly on PAC’s to fund their campaigns and provide other support during the electoral
process. Over time, campaigns have become increasingly expensive and business groups have
built a large spending advantage over labor advocates. While the exact legislative impact of
campaign finance is still being debated in social science, many contributing organizations view
such donations as an investment that will generate access to Congress and increased influence in
the legislative process. The disproportionate representation of business and other interests
relative to advocates of the poor and homeless in the political process surely raises about the
degree of pluralism in the U.S.
Lobbying
The second major way that businesses influence the legislative process is through
lobbying, defined as “legal activity aiming at changing existing rules or policies or procuring
individual benefits.”74 As with campaign finance, the available data on government advocacy
point to a decidedly pro-business slant.
The Nature and Growth of Lobbying:
Norm Ornstein and Shirley Elder cite one veteran political observer commenting on
pressure politics: “Lobbying is as old as legislation and pressure groups are as old as politics.”75
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Lobbying is certainly as old as American government: in 1783, a group of disgruntled soldiers
threatened members of the Continental Congress into increasing their pay. By the 1850s,
Washington hosted a lively lobbying industry filled with representatives of big business.76
Throughout the 20th century, the importance of this age-old activity has grown with the size and
scope of the U.S. government. While many groups lobby the executive branch and regulatory
agencies, the largest target of lobbyists is Congress, with its 535 members, various committees,
and thousands of staffers. 77 Groups seek to gain access to decision makers in an effort to
“monitor governmental activity that might affect them, initiate governmental action to promote
their interests, and block action that would work to their detriment.”78 Contact that groups have
with government officials may be direct (in the form of conversations with legislators or
testimony before a committee), semi-direct (through communications with legislative staff), or
indirect (through advertisements or other public statements). Lobbyists place a high value on
monitoring public activity, so as to be aware of any potential changes with enough time to affect
the potential action.
When trying to initiate a particular policy, high-quality access is an invaluable resource
for an interest group. One lobbyist noted: “I always make sure I have a friend on the
subcommittee, someone who will look after my interests, who will introduce and push bills or
amendments for me. If you don’t have a friend on the inside, then you’re really on the outside
looking in.”79 Lobbyists can aid legislators by providing information and policy advice, assisting
with political strategy, providing new policies and proposals, and campaign assistance. On the
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other hand, they can sanction lawmakers by asking party leadership to deny a particular member
a committee slot or leadership role, apply political pressure both in Washington and in the home
district, negatively endorse a candidate, or aid an opposing candidate.80 Lobbyists constantly try
to persuade legislators that taking particular actions will be electorally beneficial for them,
transforming Washington into a “major marketing center.”81 When coupled with strong access to
decision makers, lobbyists employ strategies designed for maximum influence on the legislative
process.
Two authors have written compelling works on interest groups in the legislative process.
In his book, The Lobbyists: How Influence Peddlers Get Their Way in Washington, Jeffrey
Birnbaum details his interactions with a group of lobbyists in 1989 and 1990. He describes the
strategies and motives of these individuals in their dealings with decision makers in Washington,
arguing that lobbyists are a well-compensated underclass in Washington society, secondary to
government members and staffs. Birnbaum illustrates the methods that lobbyists use to achieve
their ends, ranging from appeals to constituents to express their opinions to their representatives
to fundraisers and fun-filled “business trips.”82 In his books Demosclerosis and Government’s
End, Jonathan Rauch builds on the work of Birnbaum, referring to lobbyists and others as
members of the “parasite economy.” In these works, Rauch argues that David Stockman, Bill
Clinton, and Newt Gingrich failed in their quests to reform Washington due to the entrenched
and powerful nature of interest groups. He fears that the government will continue to experience
a precipitous drop in governing ability due to special interests, and describes the logic
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underpinning the current system. Both of these books provide excellent insight into the nature of
lobbying.
Since the 1960s, and particularly since the early 1980s, there has been a stunning rise in
the size and scope of lobbying operations in Washington. Lee Drutman argues that much of the
early rise in corporate lobbying had to do with the rash of new regulations in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. Whereas businesses had been content to be “left alone” previously, the threats
imposed by the government spurred them into action.83 In 1988, four of every ten lobbying
organizations with Washington offices were founded after 1960. In 1981, there were
approximately 7,000 groups listed in the Washington Representatives directory; today, this
number has increased to more than 14,000.84 Such interest groups include trade associations
ranging from the AARP and National Association of Homebuilders to the Bow Tie
Manufacturers Association and the Post Card Manufacturers Association.85 Between 2000 and
2009, direct lobbying expenses increased from $1.44 billion to $3.47 billion. When accounting
for inflation, lobbying expenses have increased an amazing seventeen-fold from the (real) $200
million in 1983.86 The growth of lobbying activity has outstripped the growth in government:
between 1998 and 2008, the federal budget grew by 38% and the number of bills introduced
increased by 43% while lobbying expenditures rose by 77%.87
Why Groups Lobby and Why the Growth in Washington:
There are two schools of thought on the question of why groups lobby. The first is that
firms decide to attempt to influence the government as a response to external stimuli.
Neoclassical scholars such as David Bicknell Truman and Beth Leech have argued that the
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government’s expansion into new areas spawns trade associations and lobbying operations
relating to the new regulation.88 They see firms as rational actors who behave predictably based
on the incentives provided to them by the government and the state of politics.89 In a 2005
paper, Beth Leech and her co-authors argue that the growth of government over time has led
interest groups to mobilize around new issues in order to either maintain current programs or to
oppose them. They claim that interest groups do not drive the formation of interest group
ecosystems; this role is more essentially based on the political and policy climate.90 Basically,
government action serves as a magnet pulling interest groups into the Washington lobbying
world: “a governmental decision to become involved in an issue area sets the agenda for existing
and potential organized interests, who are thus encouraged to come to the capital to defend their
interests and advocate particular solutions to perceived problems.”91
Another group of scholars believes that lobbying is an activity that firms learn, one that
builds and reinforces itself over time. The “Behavioral Theory” of firms posits that
organizations tend to get in the habit of participating in politics and thus continue their
involvement. The “Resource-Based Theory” conveys the idea that firms view political
engagement as a “strategic asset” that should not be discarded. Finally, the “Agent-Based View”
places emphasis on the principal-agent dilemma that results when an organization hires a
lobbyist. Because the agent is receiving money for services provided, he or she has the strong
incentive to persuade the firm to continue its Washington presence.92
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In his doctoral thesis, Lee Drutman argues that there may be many factors underpinning
the decision to lobby, but that such a decision tends to be reinforcing and that it leads to
heightened political activity. Importantly, Drutman posits that groups often stay in Washington
with the goal of changing the status quo, rather than reacting to external stimuli. He analyzes the
“stickiness” of lobbying, finding that approximately 97% of organizations with lobbying
activities stay in Washington from year to year. For those companies that do not have internal
lobbyists, but use “hired guns,” the rate of renewal is still around 90%.93 Drutman identifies a
general process by which organizations learn to lobby. First, the Washington representatives
pick issues for lobbying that will generate high value to the firm, illustrating the profitability of a
lobbying operation. Over time, they look for new issues on which to work and thus the
organization becomes more entrenched in Washington.94
A central aspect of the decision to lobby is the perception of the high profits that can be
gained through government advocacy. A relatively small change to a large piece of legislation
can have huge financial effects on particular industries, so targeted lobbying influence can prove
an excellent investment for firms. Interest groups rightly see lobbying as a tremendously
efficient way to improve business. For example, Matt Miller explores Lockheed Martin’s
lobbying activities between 1999 and 2006, finding that the company spent $55 million on
lobbying and received $90 billion in governmental contracts.95 Jeffrey Birnbaum analyzes the
rate of return on a broader range of issues and estimated the payoff to be closer to 28-1, which is
still quite a hefty sum.96 Thus, while the issues that bring firms to Washington can vary,
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lobbying tends to be an activity that firms learn to do, and one that the organizations perceive to
be exceedingly profitable.
The Bias and Influence of Lobbying:
Since the 1960s, political scientists have noted the bias towards business in the makeup
of interest groups in Washington. Lee Drutman observes that between 1981 and the present, the
Washington Representatives directory classifies 34% and 46% of its listings as individual
companies and 11% to 15% as trade associations.97 Between 1981 and 2006, as the number of
business listings grew from 7,059 to 12,785, the number of union listings only increased from
369 to 403. Over the same time period, the ratio between business groups and “countervailing
power” (unions and public interest) increased from 11.65 to 15.82.98 When lobbying
expenditures are analyzed, the gap between business and non-business groups looms even larger.
A 2001 study by Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech found that in 1996, individual companies
accounted for 56% of lobbying costs and businesses, trade associations, and professional groups
comprised 85% of total spending. In contrast, citizen groups and non-profits comprised merely
10% of total lobbying expenditures. 99
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, between 1998 and 2010, the top
industries engaging in lobbying were health, miscellaneous business, and finance/insurance/real
estate; labor placed twelfth. In this time period, miscellaneous businesses and the
finance/insurance/real estate industries each spent nearly ten times as much money on lobbying
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as did labor organizations.100 Baumgartner and Leech conclude: “the extent of business
predominance in the group system is greater than previously reported...Not only do businesses
constitute the largest category of lobbying organizations in Washington...but they are by far the
best endowed and most active.”101 Part of this imbalance may be a result of the structural
difference between corporations and public interest groups. Corporations that engage in
lobbying have the advantage of being able to use their general revenues towards political
advocacy. In contrast, membership-based public interest groups often have trouble raising the
necessary funds for a large-scale campaign.102
More importantly, the disproportionate presence of business groups (both numerically
and monetarily) has a distorting influence on the legislative process because resources tend to
translate into outcomes. In The Lobbyists, Jeffrey Birnbaum concludes that corporations have
gained significant strength in Washington, becoming “so suffused [in] the culture of the city that
at times they seem to be part of the government itself.”103 Birnbaum writes that over time,
corporate interests have transitioned from a “perennial sacrificial lamb” to a “sacred cow” in
cases of government crackdowns. Indeed, in the 1990 deficit reduction bill signed into law by
President Bush, merely 11% of revenue increases came from the corporate tax code, while the
remaining burden came from individuals.104 Presently, there is simply not much competition
between corporate and union/public interest lobbyists. In a survey conducted for his doctoral
thesis, Lee Drutman interviewed corporate lobbyists and asked them whom they viewed as their
biggest adversaries. Not once did they list unions or public interest organizations as their biggest
100
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rival. Indeed, on 37% of the issues, they claimed not to have any challengers.105 Clearly,
corporations have a significant relative advantage over their union and public interest
counterparts with regards to lobbying.
Lobbying is a practice as old as the American government, one that is based on access to
and a close relationship with members of Congress and their staffs. Lobbyists have significant
power with members of Congress in several important areas, including providing information,
campaigning, messaging, and developing proposals. The past three decades’ stunning growth of
firms with a Washington presence is likely due to both the expansion of the federal government
(the government putting more issues on the table) and the educational process of lobbying
(organizations learning to utilize advocacy and thus remaining in Washington). There is a large
gap between business organizations and unions/public interest groups in the number of groups
present in the political process and the amount of those groups money spend, and this gap has
been expanding over time. The political science literature suggests that such a disparity in
lobbying presence illustrates an advantage in both absolute and relative terms for corporate
interests.
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Part II: Case Studies

Introduction and Methodology
The thesis now turns to a case study analyzing the impact that competing interest groups
had on two key pieces of financial services legislation between 1999 and 2010. First, the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 repealed the 1933 GlassSteagall Act, removing the barriers between commercial and investment banks and insurance
companies. Many people have criticized this legislation, claiming that it enabled firms to
become “too big to fail,” contributing to the 2008 Financial Crisis. Indeed, economist and
columnist Paul Krugman called Senator Phil Gramm the “father of the financial crisis” because
of this bill.106 Next, this case study explores the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010. This legislation attempted to fix many of the problems that led to the
2007-2008 Financial Crisis and to remove causes of systemic risk from the U.S. finance,
banking, and insurance sectors. Of particular importance in this last piece of legislation is the
strength of new regulations that were opposed by corporate and financial interests and supported
by consumer advocates and unions.
This thesis draws conclusions about the relative influence of interest groups from several
sources. First, the Congressional hearings held during the legislative process are instructive as a
means to identify the issues about which various interest groups care and about which they
disagree. In addition, by observing the different iterations of a given bill prior to and after a set
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of hearings, one can spot a correlation between changes suggested and changes enacted. If a
pattern emerges in which one type of group consistently achieves its desired changes vis-à-vis
those of its rivals, disproportionate influence is suggested. In addition, this case study utilizes
policy papers, press releases, and statements by various interest groups about these pieces of
legislation. Finally, the Dodd-Frank section of the case study relies considerably on the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report to explain the causes of the Financial Crisis and
issues that needed to be reformed. If these groups were able to block a significant portion of
these proposals, then excessive influence would be suggested.
These two pieces of legislation are selected as case studies for several reasons. First, they
are important laws attracting significant attention from many interest groups. As such, the
possibility of groups failing to take stock of the legislation and mobilize accordingly is low. In
addition, Gramm-Leach-Bliley and Dodd-Frank embody intense fights between business
interests and consumer advocates, allowing one to better gauge the relative influence of both
types of organizations. Finally, these cases affect the same industries, yet were passed in two
decidedly different political climates for business groups. If financial services and banking
representatives were able to succeed in 2010, their absolute and relative superiority would be
strongly suggested.
A Note on Gauging Influence
It is admittedly difficult to establish a causal relationship between legislative outcomes
and interest group positions. The external political environment has a considerable impact on the
ease with which an interest group achieves its policy objectives. In The Governmental Process,
David Bicknell Truman notes, “As conditions change... [some] influences become more and
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others less potent, the fortunes of group claims upon the legislature will rise or decline.”107 For
example, it could be argued that the era of economic prosperity and rapid stock market growth in
the mid and late 1990s boosted the chances of legislation favored by the financial services
industry. Later, in the wake of the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis, it is possible that the momentum
for financial reform and large Democratic Congressional majorities were headwinds that banking
advocates had little chance of overcoming. A largely pro-consumer and anti-banking piece of
legislation would not establish the causal relationship that consumer advocates had much more
influence than financial services groups. If, however, the financial services industry managed to
consistently beat back attempts at regulation in 2009 and 2010, one could more reasonably infer
a causational relationship. In sum, when attempting to gauge the relative and absolute influence
of business groups, it is important to consider the external environment in which legislation is
being drafted.
It is also important to consider the numerous counter-factuals and alternate explanations
for the outcomes of these bills. It is possible that interest groups had little effect on the direction
of these pieces of legislation and that the policies enacted were simply those favored by members
of Congress. The decision to change a piece of legislation in a more pro-consumer or probusiness direction may have nothing to do with the efforts of interest groups, but reflect, instead,
an effort on behalf of party leaders to pick up votes for the proposal. In addition, one set of
interest groups might be energized on a particular issue and not face any opposition from other
organizations. As a result, one might be able to infer a certain degree of absolute power on
behalf of the active groups, but no relative power vis-à-vis their competitors. The effects of
successful lobbying may be policies that never make it into legislation. Finally, without detailed
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information regarding the exact activities of interest groups lobbying against particular measures,
it is possible that one can miss their successes in preventing the policies’ presence in any forms
of a particular piece of legislation. With all these reservations in mind, this thesis will
nonetheless attempt to gauge the absolute and relative power of interest groups in the legislative
process.
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The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999
Introduction and Background

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act repealed much of the
1933 Banking Act, known as Glass-Steagall. It removed market barriers to firms acting as a
combination of a commercial bank, investment bank, and insurance company. The consideration
of this bill was triggered by Citicorp’s merger with Travelers Group in 1998. The firms took
advantage of previous financial services legislation that granted firms a two-year period
following a merger or acquisition to divest of offending activities.108 Following announcement
of the merger, Congress was spurred into action to update financial services law to deal with the
brewing legal implications of this deal. It was given the choice of repealing sections of GlassSteagall or breaking up what was the nation’s largest financial firm.
Financial services modernization was not an issue that arose in the late 1990s: the
banking and insurance industries had been working since the1980s to repeal Glass-Steagall. In
1983, President Reagan proposed allowing commercial and investment banks, securities firms,
and insurance companies to enter each other’s markets, but the proposal gained little traction. In
1991, a bill similar to Gramm-Leach-Bliley failed to pass the House.109 Throughout the mid-tolate 1990s, these industries worked hard to pass banking reform: between 1996 and 2000, the
number of financial services lobbyists increased from around 150 to just under 250.110 The
financial services industry placed considerable pressure on Congress to pass financial services
modernization. In 1999 alone, the financial service industry spent $187 million on lobbying and
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donated $202 million to campaigns.111 Ed Yingling, the chief lobbyist for the American Bankers
Association, called GLB ‘“the most heavily lobbied, most expensive issue’ to come before
Congress in a generation.”112 According to the New York Times, after the bill was signed into
law, Citigroup CEO Sandy Weill placed on his wall “a hunk of wood-at least 4 feet wide-etched
with his portrait and the words ‘The Shatterer of Glass-Steagall.’”113
Advocates of the legislation argued that it would add efficiency to the financial system:
people put more money in investment accounts when the economy is doing well and more into
savings accounts when it is performing poorly. If commercial and investment banks were not
separated, people could more easily place money in both savings and investment accounts at the
same time. In doing so, firms engaging in investment and commercial banking would perform
better in both good and bad economic times. In addition, industry advocates claimed that the
proposed legislation would help consumers by spurring on the growth of myriad new products by
firms offering expanded services and competition, giving them the opportunity to have multiple
needs met by the same institution. With the development of the Internet and other electronic
banking services, the past model of regional banks was seen as outdated; financial services law
should be updated to reflect these changes.114 In addition, the proposed legislation would make
U.S. institutions more competitive with foreign banks that already offered diverse products.115
Some advocates of deregulation claimed that larger institutions would pose fewer systemic risks:
“Bigger would be safer…and more diversified, innovative, efficient, and better able to serve the
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needs of an expanding economy.”116 At the same time, however, some people worried that evergrowing institutions would create entities that were “too big to fail,” posing large risks to the
entire financial system and economy.117
House and Senate Hearings on the Bill
From February 10-12, 1999, the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services
held hearings about the proposed financial services modernization legislation. A Senate draft bill
was released in February of 1999, and was followed by hearings in front of the Committee on
Banking from February 23-25. During the hearing process for GLB, four broad sets of interests
developed: those of large banks and financial institutions, those of smaller banks and businesses,
those of consumer advocates, and those of the Clinton Administration. In general, the large
businesses supported the bill strongly, small banks approved tepidly or opposed it, and consumer
advocates criticized the legislation for failing to protect individuals. The Clinton Administration
accepted the need for financial modernization, but had serious reservations about the lack of
consumer protections.
Big Financial Institutions:
In general, the banking and securities industries had favorable views towards draft
versions of GLB. On February 25, Michael Patterson, the Vice Chairman of JP Morgan and
Chairman of the Financial Services Council, testified before the Senate Banking Committee. He
spoke in strong support of removing barriers between banks and insurance companies, claiming
that a failure to do so would leave U.S. companies at a disadvantage to their foreign counterparts.
He claimed that Glass-Steagall represented a different era in finance and was no longer
applicable, and that banks should be allowed to participate in more commerce. Overall,
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Patterson agreed with the general outline for the Senate draft of GLB and offered minor
suggestions to improve the legislation.118 Robert Gillespie of KeyCorp and the Bankers
Roundtable and Hjalma Johnson, Chairman and CEO of East Coast Bank Corp the American
Bankers Association, both spoke in strong support of the Senate draft bill. Gillespie and Johnson
both made it a point to mention their support of sections of the bill relating to the treatment of the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). The CRA, which was enacted in 1977, sought to curtail
the practice of “redlining,” whereby banks would draw boundaries around neighborhoods to
which they extended credit. Johnson claimed that the CRA hurt banks in relation to their
competition and burdened them with significant paperwork. He also argued in favor of allowing
banks to engage in “a limited basket” of commercial activities, claiming that this would lead to
community development in some cases. However, Johnson claimed that such co-mingling
should only be allowed to occur on a limited basis so as to protect the independence of banking
and commercial industries.119 One of his major complaints about the bill was its unequal
regulatory treatment of thrifts and banks. Johnson urged the Banking Committee to equalize the
regulations on holding companies of banks and thrifts in order to prevent the flow of capital into
the industry with less regulation. On the whole, both of these witnesses spoke in strong support
of the measures in GLB.
Jeff Tassey of the American Financial Services Association and Marc Lackritz of the
Securities Industry Association also addressed the panel on February 25. These two
representatives of the securities industry strongly supported the framework for financial
118
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modernization. However, Lackritz opposed language that would allow banks to engage in
securities trading, proposing that the banks would instead have to engage in securities trading
through separate affiliates owned by the larger institutions. In addition, he urged the committee
to put all firms that traded securities under the jurisdiction of the SEC, so as to make regulation
fairer.120 Similarly, speaking before the House Banking Committee earlier that month, Roy
Zuckerberg of the Securities Industry Association heaped nearly unqualified praise on the House
version of the bill.121 Therefore, representatives of the banking and securities industries reacted
very favorably to the draft versions of GLB and tended to advocate for relatively minor tweaks to
the legislation.
Small and Community Banks/Independent Insurance Agents:
Representatives of small and community banks had mixed reactions to the draft versions
of GLB. William McQuillan of the Independent Bankers Association of America appeared
before the House on February 10 before the Senate Committee on February 25. At the Senate
hearing, he criticized the legislation for disproportionately favoring large financial institutions,
creating the possibility of “too big to fail” institutions and endangering the Federal Deposit
Insurance Fund in the event of the collapse of a financial conglomerate.122 He cited the recent
collapse of Long Term Capital Management and claimed that GLB would have the effect of
increasing systemic risk and leading to future bailouts. In addition, he argued that the recent
trend of mergers in the banking and financial service industries had anti-competitive effects,
especially in the credit and debit card markets, to the detriment of small and community
120
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banks.123 McQuillan criticized the Senate draft for allowing too much mingling between banks
and commercial firms, a policy that would “encourage financial institutions to engage in the kind
of crony capitalism” that had recently undermined the economies of several foreign countries.124
Finally, he asked the Senate to enforce consumer protection and CRA regulations more
uniformly across all depository institutions. McQuillan claimed that community banks were
much more burdened than less regulated entities such as credit unions.125 In his House
testimony, McQuillan was more in favor of the legislation proposed, but dedicated a significant
amount of his testimony to opposing the removal of barriers between banks and commercial
firms.126
Scott Sinder of the Independent Insurance Agents of America (IIAA) delivered powerful
testimony to the Senate on February 25. He said that while the IIAA had recently come around
to the idea of financial modernization, it was disappointed with the Senate draft bill and was
unprepared to support it. Sinder claimed that the legislation failed to apply equal regulations to
all issuers of insurance and did not adequately address concerns over consumer protections. He
urged the committee to insert language into the bill affirming the rights of states to regulate
insurance companies. This would ensure that national entities would not be exempt from
regulation, as “no comparable regulations exist at the federal level and no federal regulator has
expertise in this arena.”127 The preemption of state regulations would be dangerous to
consumers, as it would lead to the loss of state regulatory safety nets that were stronger than that
of the federal government. In addition, Sinder argued that states should have the right to
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discriminate more between banks and non-banks in cases where consumer protections were at
stake. Finally, he claimed that consumers would ultimately be harmed if the policies he
suggested were not inserted into the bill.128 Thus, while representatives of community banks and
independent insurance agents were amenable to financial modernization, they had significant
concerns about the Senate and House draft bills.
Consumer Advocates:
Consumer advocates were in strong opposition to many of the policies contained within
the House and Senate draft versions of GLB. On February 25, advocates from the Consumer
Federation of America (CFA) and Center for Community Change criticized the Senate draft bill
for targeting programs that benefited low income Americans, such as provisions in the CRA.
Mary Griffin of the CFA lampooned the legislation for being weighted in favor of the wealthy
and financial sector: “Thus far, we have been disappointed that the balance has been tipped too
much in favor of industry and regulators' interests, and not the consumer interest…we believe the
current proposal is a big step backwards for consumers.”129 She urged the committee to
strengthen protections for consumers purchasing insurance and was dismayed by the lack of any
protections in the realm of securities. In addition, she worried about the risk of private
information being shared between entities and supported stronger non-disclosure requirements in
the law. 130 While Griffin accepted the likelihood of financial modernization, she implored the
committee to “ensure the market serves the needs of all consumers and does not simply cater to
the wealthiest.”131

128

Ibid.
Mary Griffin, “Prepared Testimony of Mary Griffin, Consumers Union and Consumer Federation of America,”
Senate Housing, Banking, and Urban Affairs Committee, February 25, 1999. Available through Proquest
Congressional.
130
Ibid.
131
Ibid.
129

Silverman

43

F. Barton Harvey, the Chairman and CEO of the Enterprise Foundation, a group
dedicated to rebuilding neighborhoods and helping people to “take control of their lives and
communities,” appeared before the Senate Banking Community on February 25.132 He focused
his testimony on provisions in the draft version affecting the CRA. Harvey cited the good that
the CRA did for inner-city neighborhoods and how it also happened to be profitable for banks.
He wanted the Senate draft’s language insinuating that CRA groups extort banks into lending to
underserved areas removed. Finally, Harvey supported the House bill’s precondition that any
financial institution wishing to engage in new lending activities must have a “satisfactory” or
better CRA rating, which proved an easy bar to clear, as 97% of banks met that standard.133 In
his testimony before the committee, John Taylor of the National Community Reinvestment
Coalition addressed many of the same concerns as F. Barton Harvey, but also expressed his
worry about the disclosure requirements in the bill. He claimed that the legislation would lead to
many new financial products, yet acknowledged that, “worrisome evidence abounds that the
banking industry is not properly disclosing the risk associated with [existing] non-deposit
investment products.”134 Taylor advocated clear rules dictating that consumers have the right to
decide when and under what circumstances their personal information is shared.
On February 11, George Reider, the Connecticut Commissioner of Insurance and
Commissioner of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, testified before the
House Banking and Financial Services Committee. He criticized the House draft of GLB for
preempting State Insurance Commissioners’ rights to enforce consumer protections within their
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jurisdictions. It would also harm efforts to streamline existing regulations and develop
uniformity and eliminate redundancy between states, injecting uncertainty into the regulation of
consumer protections in insurance. He asked the committee to restore the rights of state
regulators to ensure consumer protections within their territories.135 The same day, Edmund
Mierzwinski, the Consumer Program Director of the U.S. Public Interest Research Group,
appeared before the House Committee. He implied that the present legislation did not taking into
account the needs of consumers nearly as much as it attempted to mediate issues between
regulators and business groups: “It is critical that the Congress balance this bill, not only
between the regulators and the special interest, but also in the public interest.”136
Finally, on February 11, Ralph Nader, appearing as a consumer advocate, lampooned the
House draft legislation for ignoring the interests of consumers: “A charitable reading of H.R. 10,
Mr. Chairman, would be that it is complicated incitement to consumer riot.”137 He criticized the
bill for failing to strengthen the current regulatory framework and for making the Federal
Reserve, an institution he characterized as “an indentured big bank agency,” the lead regulator.138
Finally, Nader worried about the possibility of taxpayer deposit insurance dollars being used to
bail out a bank that has been brought down by one of its sub-entities, like insurance. In sum,
consumer advocates appearing before the Senate and House Banking Committees during
February of 1999 criticized the draft legislation for failing to protect individual privacy,
weakening the regulatory framework, hurting the CRA, and catering to the interests of big
business over consumers.
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The Clinton Administration:
The Clinton Administration supported financial modernization, but placed a strong
emphasis on protecting consumers. On February 23, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan
Greenspan spoke in strong support of the GLB framework. He claimed that if Congress did not
act, then “developments will undermine the competitiveness and innovative edge of major
segments of our financial services industry.”139 On February 24, Treasury Secretary Robert
Rubin addressed the committee. While he did acknowledge that legislation could streamline the
natural process of financial modernization, he also claimed that the draft contained “significant
provisions that are unacceptable to the Administration, and we would oppose the bill in its
current form.”140 Primarily, Rubin worried about the buildup of systemic risk and economic
concentration. In addition, he was concerned about several provisions that would weaken the
Community Reinvestment Act’s support for lending to low and moderate-income individuals.
Finally, he worried that the bill did not offer proper disclosure requirements and protections for
consumers, given the wide range of new financial products that financial modernization
allowed.141
Ellen Seidman, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, spoke to the Senate
Banking Committee on February 24. She applauded the general idea of financial modernization,
so long as it ensured the continued safety of the banking system and maintained much of the
current regulatory structure over savings and loan institutions. However, Seidman opposed
portions of the bill that reduced consumer protections and coverage by the CRA, claiming that
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existing regulations ensure that thrift institutions expand their operations to previously
underserved communities: “the CRA stimulates insured depository institutions to pursue
creative and profitable financing endeavors they might not have otherwise explored.”142
In his testimony to the Senate Banking Committee, Securities and Exchange Commission
Chairman Arthur Levitt opposed the wide gaps in securities regulation left by the draft version of
the GLB Act. In particular, he was concerned about leaving banking exemptions to securities
law, even as banks would be allowed to engage in investment banking activities, leaving a
“dangerously bifurcated system of regulation.”143 The SEC believed that a financial system with
such a loophole intact would undermine the rights of investors and impede the SEC in its mission
to “safeguard the integrity, fairness, transparency, and liquidity of U.S. securities markets.”144
He claimed that loss of fairness and transparency in the market would hurt both investors and the
economy. Similarly, on February 12, Harvey Goldschmid, the General Counsel of the SEC,
argued before the House Banking Committee that the House version of the legislation would
provide very different forms of investor protection at securities firms and banks, a situation of
which the individual may not even be aware. He described this problem of legislation in no
uncertain terms: “At best, the state of affairs is inconsistent. At worst, which may very well be
the case, it is dangerous.”145 In sum, members of the Clinton Administration supported the idea
of financial services modernization, but had strong misgivings about the nature of early House
and Senate drafts of the legislation.
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The Senate Version

On May 6, 1999, the Senate passed S. 900, the upper chamber’s version of financial
modernization, by the margin of 54-44. 146 Of the 54 Senators voting in favor of the bill, 53 were
Republicans; the 44 voting against it were all Democrats. The Senate bill differed from the final
GLB legislation in two important ways. First, it contained no sections covering consumer
protections. While other versions of the legislation would address the issue of the rights of
individuals to not have their private information disclosed, S. 900 did not touch the subject.147 In
addition, the Senate bill attempted to roll back the CRA. In Section 303, the legislation
considered any bank that had been rated “satisfactory” in its previous CRA inspection to be so
until its next examination, making it difficult for consumer complaints to overturn such ratings.
The CRS describes this part of the legislation as placing “the burden of proving the substantial
verifiable nature of information alleging CRA noncompliance upon the party filing such
information,” rather than upon the accused bank. In addition, S. 900 granted a huge exemption
from the CRA to community banks, waving the regulation for any bank not located in a
metropolitan area and not exceeding $100 million in assets.148
The Senate version of GLB took a decidedly pro-bank and anti-consumer stance. This
legislation barely reflected the views of consumer advocates that came before the panel. By
failing to contain a consumer protection section and placing the burden of proof on individuals in
reporting CRA violations, this bill clearly favored business interests. Interestingly, the Senate’s
exemption of small banks from the CRA illustrates the influence of those small banks in the
legislative process, relieving that industry of a potentially large cost. The Senate’s near party146
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line vote (with the more pro-consumer Democratic Party voting against) provides significant
evidence to support the hypothesis that S.900 demonstrates a strong relative advantage of
banking interests over consumer advocates.
House Version
On July 1, 1999, H.R. 10 passed the House by the wide margin of 343-86. The House
bill was decidedly more consumer-friendly than the Senate one. Section 110 was meant to
ensure that the CRA was fulfilling its mission: this clause required a report from the Treasury
Secretary analyzing whether the CRA was succeeding in providing credit to low and middle
income Americans, as well as to small businesses and farms.149 In addition, the entirely of Title
V in the bill was dedicated to consumer protection and privacy rights.150 Apart from the bill’s
treatment of consumers and the CRA, H.R. 10 was quite similar to S. 900 and the final version of
GLB.
Ironically, a Victoria’s Secret catalog had a significant influence on the addition of
consumer privacy protections in the House version of the GLB Act. During markups of the bill
in the Commerce Committee, Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA) introduced an Amendment providing
privacy protections to consumers, called “Title V.” Conservative Republican Rep. Joe Barton
(R-TX) provided crucial support for this amendment, relating the story of his own experience of
having his personal information sold to firms. Barton’s credit union sold his address to
Victoria’s Secret, which began sending catalogs to his Washington house. He worried that his
wife would find the magazines and think he was buying lingerie for other women. According to
a later statement by consumer advocate Ed Mierzwinski, banking industry lobbyists were caught
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off guard by Barton’s support and were unable to react in time to stall the amendment’s
passage.151
One important proposal that was not accepted in the House version of GLB was a clause
allowing bank holding companies to merge with commercial institutions. For example, if such
inter-mingling was allowed, Citigroup might try to merge with Wal-Mart or G.E. While many
lobbyists from the financial services industry advocated this policy and while the bipartisan
Congressional leadership, the Treasury, and some people in the Federal Reserve agreed, Rep.
Jim Leach (R-IA) succeeded in preventing its inclusion in any legislation.152 He feared that the
removal of barriers between commercial enterprises and bank holding companies would produce
incentives to control commercial firms, rather than lend to families and entrepreneurs. As a
result, “the mission of banking would have been transformed from stimulating innovation and
entrepreneurship to precipitating asset conglomeration,” concentrating wealth in the hands of
very few people.153 Interestingly, Leach argued against this provision by asserting to the banking
industry that there was a good chance that their parent firms would be bought by commercial
enterprises, rather than the other way around.154 The defeat of this provision represents the limits
of the absolute power of the banking industry in influencing the legislative process: even when
the banking industry had the support of party leadership and parts of the Administration, its
initiatives were still thwarted largely by one member of Congress. Therefore, H.R. 10 was a
much more consumer-friendly bill than the Senate version, a characteristic which is likely
reflected in its overwhelmingly strong margin of passage and bipartisan support.
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Final Legislation

Following passages of H.R. 10, the House and Senate were unable to come to terms on a
joint version of the bill. When a conference committee was established at the end of July, its
members were instructed to craft a pro-consumer compromise: “Consumers enjoy the benefits
of comprehensive financial modernization legislation that provides robust competition and equal
and non-discriminatory access to financial services and economic opportunities in their
communities”155 Following tense negotiations between the Clinton Administration and Senate
Republicans, Gramm-Leach-Bliley passed the House and Senate on November 4, 1999 by the
wide margins of 90-8 in the Senate and 362-57 in the House.156
Title I in the bill repealed elements of Glass-Steagall and the Bank Holdings Act that
prohibited banks from engaging in financial services activities and insurance. On the issue of
insurance regulation, the bill partially preempted state laws that “impede or restrict” insurance
issuance from insured depositary institutions and enumerated the state regulations that are
permitted.157 Still, Section 111 explicitly gave the regulatory jurisdiction of insurance
subsidiaries of banks to the state governments. Section 108 of Title I addressed concerns about
“too big to fail,” ordering a study and report to Congress about the possibilities for too big to fail
institutions and ways to minimize systemic risk.158 Subtitle C of Title II gave certain investment
bank holding companies the option of picking the SEC as their lead regulator, while also giving
them the right to voluntarily withdraw from such supervision.159 The legislation instructed the
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Federal Reserve to observe companies with both insurance and banking subsidiaries, keeping an
eye on the sharing of business operations information.
The final version of GLB changed the way institutions were regulated, giving the
financial services industry greater leeway. For example, banks regulated by the Federal Reserve
could own securities affiliates regulated by the SEC that were required to hold significantly less
collateral. In addition, securities firms were allowed to own thrifts and industrial loan
companies, entities with accessed to FDIC-insured deposits and free of regulation by the Fed.160
Investment banks quickly took advantage of this rule: between 1999 and 2007, Merrill Lynch
expanded its industrial loan company from less than $1 billion to $4 billion. Similarly, Lehman
Brothers increased its thrift from $88 million in 1998 to $24 billion in 2005.161 Such measures
were not contested by any major interest groups, even though the deregulation posed the danger
of building systemic risk. Thus, the deregulation of financial institution supervision
demonstrates the absolute power of business interests in gaining favorable measures from
Congress.
GLB and Consumer Rights:
The GLB Act created some questions about privacy and consumer rights. If different
types of banking firms engaged in insurance activities, there would be greater risk of the
unwanted use of personal information. As such, the amount of information sharing allowed and
the disclosure of companies’ privacy policies was an important issue for consumer advocates.
The negotiation of these consumer privacy rights was an important sticking point in the
legislation, particularly for Democrats, the resolution of which helped to ensure its ultimate
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bipartisan passage. The final bill contained three important rules--the Financial Privacy Rule,
the Safeguards Rule, and pretexting provisions--that sought to mitigate these privacy concerns.
GLB contained relatively significant explicit consumer protections. Section 305 of the
bill directed federal banking agencies to issue regulations prohibiting insurance companies from
conditioning the extension of consumer credit on purchasing other products, requiring the
physical separation of banking and insurance activities, and outlawing discrimination against
victims of domestic violence. In addition, Section 305 mandated that federal banking regulators
establish an expedited mechanism for consumers to lodge complaints and allege violations of the
bill.162 Section 324 required the National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers to
create an office for consumer complaints.
The entirely of Title V was devoted to privacy and the appropriate use of consumer
information, and its language was virtually identical to the Title V language in H.R. 10. The act
clearly stated that it is the duty of financial institutions to protect consumers: “Each financial
institution has an affirmative, continuing obligation to respect the privacy and to protect the
confidentiality of customer nonpublic personal information.”163 The GLB Act required firms to
provide an account of their privacy policies to customers, defined as individuals who are
engaged in continuous relationships with the financial institutions. Such statements had to
include the details of “what information the company collects about its consumers and
customers, with whom it shares the information, and how it protects or safeguards the
information.”164
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In contrast, consumers were defined as individuals who have used a product of service
from a particular financial institution. The distinction between customers and consumers is
important because consumers were not entitled to a privacy notice unless the firm would be
sharing his or her information with non-affiliated firms.165 In addition, customers and consumers
had the right to opt out of information sharing, and firms’ privacy statements must clearly state
the means by which they may do so. Such opt-out rights were not limited to outside firms, but
also included the affiliates of the financial institution.166 Title V gave enforcement power to the
FTC, banking, and securities agencies and required the FTC and Attorney General to report
annually to Congress on the status of these consumer protections.167 The opt-out provisions are
important because they allow customers and consumers to avoid having their personal
information shared with other firms (like insurance companies) that could ultimately prove
detrimental to their interests.
Finally, Subtitle B of Title VII reflected a compromise between the Clinton
Administration and Senator Gramm on the Community Reinvestment Act. In late October of
1999, the bill was in danger of being killed over disputes between the Administration and
Gramm about the nature of the CRA. Gramm wanted to exempt thousands of smaller banks
from the regulation, claiming that it placed a huge burden on them; meanwhile, the White House
wanted to outlaw the right of banks with an unsatisfactory CRA lending record to expand into
new businesses. In the end, Chris Dodd (D-CT) and Chuck Schumer (D-NY) managed to forge a
compromise between the two sides, allowing the bill to move forward.168 Section 712 set up a
schedule for small bank exemptions to CRA exams, provided they had met standards for
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community lending. The large margin of passage reflects pro-consumer measures such as
expanded individual privacy rights and a protected CRA.169
Despite the importance of Title V to consumers, there are several business-friendly
aspects of the privacy rules in GLB. First, the onus of deciding whether to opt out of information
sharing falls on consumers, rather than the burden to request and receive permission to
disseminate such data falling on financial institutions. When companies provide the opt-out
wavers to consumers, they may be difficult to decipher and filled jargon. As a result, people who
do not want their personal information to be shared may be unable to understand how to prevent
firms from sharing it. Despite these concerns, according to John Tatom, the privacy protections
in GLB have proven to be effective in preventing the wide dissemination of personal information
across subsidiaries of larger institutions. Interestingly, Citigroup provided significant leadership
in crafting privacy restrictions contained within GLB.170
Conclusions and Reflections
The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 represents the culmination of years of
lobbying on behalf of the banking, financial services, and insurance sectors to overturn GlassSteagall. On the whole, interest groups representing big business appear to have been quite
successful in getting Congress to pass legislation in accordance with their preferences. However,
business influence was not hegemonic vis-à-vis consumer advocates. Representatives of
consumers were successful in attaining privacy requirements in resisting attempts to undermine
the CRA. It is probable that, when these provisions were changed or added, more pro-consumer
representatives and Senators switched their votes in favor of the bill, allowing the final
legislation to pass by such a wide margin.
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It should be noted that, since it possessed the power to veto unfavorable legislation, the
Clinton Administration had significant power as an advocate for groups other than the financial
services sector. In late October of 1999, financial modernization legislation was nearly dead, as
the Administration threatened to veto anything that did not protect consumers and maintain the
CRA. Given the split between the more pro-consumer House legislation and very pro-business
Senate bill, it is difficult to assess the exact degree to which consumer advocates influenced this
legislation. In particular, three main counter-factual questions emerge. First, what would the
fate of Title V have been had Rep. Joe Barton not strongly supported it? In addition, how would
consumer protections and the CRA have been affected if the Clinton Administration were not so
active in their favor? Finally, when pressure mounted, did banking and financial services interest
groups cave on issues of lesser importance to them (consumer protection and the CRA) in order
to gain passage of the rest of GLB (a strong interest)?
This case fits well into the current literature that emphasizes the strong advantage that
business groups have throughout the legislative process, but also demonstrates the durability of
consumer advocacy. Thus, while the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act did reward the financial services
industry for years of lobbying, consumer advocates were ultimately able (with the help of the
Clinton Administration) to influence lawmakers on some key issues.
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The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
Introduction and Background

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was signed into law
by President Obama on July 21, 2010.171 It represented the largest single overhaul of banking
and financial services regulation since Glass-Steagall was passed in 1933. Dodd-Frank was
largely a response to the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis. In June of 2009, President Obama called
for a “new foundation” to the financial system through legislation that would be a “sweeping
overhaul of the financial regulatory system, a transformation on a scale not seen since the
reforms that followed the Great Depression.”172 The bill, which spanned nearly 1000 pages, was
broken up into sixteen titles, required regulatory agencies to write 243 rules, and called for 67
one-time studies and 22 new periodicals.173 Dodd-Frank coincided with a rash of spending and
campaign contributions by business interest groups. According to 2010 numbers from the Center
for Responsive Politics, the finance/insurance/real estate sectors spent more than $475 million in
lobbying expenditures and gave nearly $63 million to Congressional candidates through PAC’s
from 2008-2010.174
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Causes of the Financial Crisis:
In 2007 and 2008, the U.S. economy was hit with the largest financial meltdown since the
Great Depression. During the crisis, two of the country’s largest investment banks--Bear Stearns
and Lehman Brothers--either filed for bankruptcy or were sold for a fraction of their recent
worth. In addition, Congress passed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to stabilize the
financial system and keep the economic downturn from spiraling out of control. In 2011, the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Board submitted an illuminating report on the causes of the crisis. The
report concluded that the calamity was avoidable and that there had been strong warning signs of
the crisis that went either ignored or discounted.175
The people responsible for the crisis included banks, securities firms, mortgage
originators, government regulators, credit rating agencies, and consumers. On Wall Street, the
constant pursuit of risk and increased leverage fueled the Financial Crisis. Firms continually
sought new ways to reduce the amount of collateral they were required to own, thus giving them
an opportunity to earn higher profits. Banks sought risky loans on which they could earn high
rates of return and sell to risk-seeking investors. At Merrill Lynch, CEO Stan O’Neil pushed the
firm to take on more risk, hiring “aggressive young turks while getting rid of those who didn’t
have the risk appetite he was looking for.”176 Such actions led to the mortgage machine, through
which Wall Street firms needed to fill a seemingly insatiable appetite for investments with higher
yields. This mentality created a system that was in serious danger of creating a financial crisis.
The inflation of the mortgage bubble was greatly aided by poor and predatory mortgage
origination, led by originating companies that competed for market share and sought to sell off
their mortgages to Wall Street banks as quickly possible. In 2003, approximately 8% of
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originated loans were “subprime,” lent to borrowers without ideal credit. By 2005, this number
had more than doubled to 20% and was still rising. 177 Most subprime loans were not classic 30year fixed interest rate mortgages, but hybrid, adjustable-rate mortgages with a low teaser rates.
For example, a 2/28 loan would have a low set rate for the first two years and then would reset to
a higher, adjustable interest rate during the third year.178 In some cases, people were sold 80/20
piggyback loans, in which the homebuyer would take out two loans: one for the mortgage and
one for the down payment.179 Possibly the most dangerous type of subprime loan was the “Pay
Option ARM.” These products let consumers choose whatever interest rate they wanted from
the start, beginning at a teaser rate so low that it did not even cover the accumulation of interest.
Once the money owed by the consumer increased to a certain level, a trigger would kick in,
forcing the borrower to suddenly begin paying the full interest rate.180 Compounding the risk of
the existence such mortgages on a large scale was their sheer profitability: Pay Option ARM’s
were five-times more profitable for mortgage originators than a prime fixed-rate loan.181
Between 2003 and 2006, the market volume of such loans increased from $65 billion to $255
billion.182 The continuation of the system was built on the proposition that the housing market
would continue to go up indefinitely; in order to prevent defaulting on loans, subprime borrowers
would frequently refinance and receive new teaser rates. If the housing market either crested or
fell, borrowers would be unable to refinance and default rates would skyrocket.
In order to meet the constant Wall Street demand for loans, originators had to drop
lending standards. One solution was to decrease the amount of documentation required to
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receive a loan. Between 2000 and 2007, the percentage of all loans that were low-and no-doc
increased from 2% to 9%. In 2006, 80% of nonprime Alt-A loans had limited or no
documentation.183 The mortgage origination market was fraught with examples of fraud and
predatory lending. In many cases, employees of originators would falsify documents to approve
customers for loans that they would never be able to repay. In All the Devils Are Here, Joe
Nocera and Bethany McLean tell stories of loan originators forging signatures and entire
documents in order to get loans approved. One former Ameriquest loan officer named Lisa
Taylor alleged in court documents that management “cordoned, encouraged, and participated in
extensive document alteration, manipulation, and forging in order to sell more loans.”184 Without
the actions of subprime mortgage originators, the housing bubble would not have been able to
grow nearly as large as it did.
The credit rating agencies--Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch--were faced with
perverse business incentives and consistently overrated mortgage-backed securities right up to
the start of the crisis. These agencies were essential to the operation of the mortgage
securitization process: they rated tranches of mortgage-backed securities and other derivatives,
and provided information critical for banks in determining how much collateral to hold.185
Unfortunately, their business model created large and destructive conflicts of interest. The
ratings agencies were paid for every deal they rated. In addition, the existence of three
institutions allowed Wall Street firms to “shop ratings,” playing them against each other and
creating incentives to give favorable ratings.186 After Moody’s went public in 2000, its drive for
market share increased and it began to care less about issuing accurate ratings than it did about

183

Ibid., 110.
Nocera and McLean, 130.
185
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 118.
186
Nocera and McLean, 117.
184

Silverman

60

gaining business.187 Adding to the problem, the share of Moody’s revenue contributed by
structured financial products (of which mortgage backed securities were a part) more than
quadrupled between 2000 and 2007. According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, the credit
agencies’ financial risk models for mortgage-backed securities were based on faulty assumptions
and failed to take into account negative trends in loan underwriting standards.188 As a result, the
credit ratings agencies rated thousands of mortgage-backed securities as being much less risky
than they actually were, thereby subjecting the entire financial system to unknown risks.
One of the largest factors underlying the eventual size and severity of the Financial Crisis
was the influence of credit derivatives, especially collateralized debt obligations (CDO’s),
synthetic collateralized debt obligations (synthetic CDO’s), and credit default swaps (CDS’s). A
CDO is a bundle of tranches (sections, rated by risk-level) of other securities that is repackaged
in its own security. Prior to the Financial Crisis, investment banks were having a difficult time
selling the riskier tranches of mortgage-backed securities, so they “created the investor” for
them.189 Because of faulty ratings models (and often a lack of will to be more accurate), the
ratings agencies classified 80% of these CDO’s as AAA, as safe as U.S. Treasury bonds.190
Then, the banks were able to sell these new securities relatively easily. Adding to the risk were
credit default swaps. Essentially, a credit default swap is an insurance policy on a security or
securities: the buyer pays a fee to the insurer, but is covered in the event of any losses in the
underlying security. CDS’s were the vehicle that nearly brought down AIG: the firm’s financial
services practice ultimately insured $533 billion of securities by 2007.191
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However, what turned the proverbial “keg of dynamite” into a “nuclear bomb” was the
addition of the synthetic CDO.192 Synthetic CDO’s are collections of CDS’s referencing existing
CDO’s. They contained no asset-backed tranches and essentially served no purpose other than to
bet on the performance of the underlying securities. As such, every synthetic was a zero-sum
game: one party went long and one went short; one made money and one lost it.193 Synthetic
CDO’s allowed the replication of risky securities many times over: there was no limit to the
number of side-bets that could be made on other securities, so long as there were people willing
to take both sides of the wager. For example, one tranche in a CDO called Glacier Funding CDO
2006 4-A had the original worth of $15 million, but was referenced in $85 million of synthetic
CDO’s.194 Tranches used by Goldman Sachs in these derivatives were replicated as many as 9
times.195 Thus, CDO’s, CDS’s, and synthetic CDO’s were powerful contributors to the buildup
of risk in the financial system.
The financial crisis was also a profound and spectacular failure of government policy. In
the late 1990s, the Clinton Administration had an internal debate regarding the proper way to
regulate derivatives. Brooksley Born, the head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) proposed regulating Over the Counter derivatives as futures under the authority of
CFTC, but was ultimately rebuffed by others in the Administration. The Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 solidified the deregulation of derivatives, banning CFTC from
claiming oversight authority.196 The power to regulate derivatives would have been extremely
important to the government’s having a better idea of the buildup of risk from mortgage-backed
derivatives. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report blames the Treasury, Fed, and other agencies
192
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for failing to realize that risk was being concentrated in the financial system, rather than
diversified. In addition, it claims that the federal regulators’ response amounted to “programs to
put fingers in the dike.” It continues to argue that such regulars had no unified plan to contain
the crisis, leading to confused and inconsistent actions.197 Therefore, the Financial Crisis was
largely caused and exacerbated by the excessive pursuit of risk and leverage, poor and predatory
lending standards, credit derivatives, and ineffective government action. Dodd-Frank sought to
correct these and other problems.
Committee Hearings
Between the fall of 2008 and the final passage of Dodd-Frank in the summer of 2010, the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and Committee on Agriculture and
House Committee on Oversight and Regulation, Committee on Financial Services, Committee
on Energy and Commerce, and Committee on Agriculture held dozens of hearings on the
financial crisis and policies being considered for regulatory reform. A few broad trends have
presented themselves throughout these panels.
Banking Industry Advocates:
Representatives of the banking industry opposed many of the new proposed regulations
that were being considered for financial regulatory reform. This sentiment is embodied in a
November, 2009 quote by Ed Yingling, the President of the American Bankers Association, to
the Washington Post: “To some degree, it looks like they're just blowing up everything for the
sake of change…If this were to happen, the regulatory system would be in chaos for years. You
have to look at the real-world impact of this.”198

197

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, xxi-xxii.
Binyamin Appelbaum and Brady Dennis, “Legislation by Senator Dodd Would Overhaul Banking Regulators,”
Washington Post, November 11, 2009.
198

Silverman

63

On September 30, 2009, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing on
proposed consumer protection reform. Michael Menzies of the Eastern Community Bank and
Trust and the Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA) was concerned that the
CFPB would harm small and community banks, while leaving large institutions both “too big to
fail” and “too big to regulate.”199 He claimed that since the CFPB was not concerned with the
safety and soundness of community banks, it would tend to release rules that would ‘‘promulgate
unnecessarily burdensome or contrary rules to those issued by the prudential regulator.’’200
Instead, the ICBA requested that the CFPB be given separate guidelines in dealing with smaller
entities. Finally, Ed Yingling of the American Bankers Association testified before the House
Financial Services Committee. While he commended the panel for adding more nuance to
consumer protection rules, he also asked it to consider the interests of community banks, “the
great majority of which had nothing to do with causing the financial crisis, which are struggling
with a growing mountain of regulatory burdens.”201 Yingling claimed that the CFPB was given
powers well beyond what were needed to correct the wrongs of the Financial Crisis. In
particular, he criticized the use of “vague terms” in establishing guidelines for the agency,
arguing that they will lead to “uncertainty” in credit markets, causing a reduction in credit
extension.202
On February 4, 2010, E. Gerald Corrigan, a Managing Director at Goldman Sachs,
appeared before the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee. He opposed
several aspects of the Volcker rule then being proposed by President Obama and considered by
the Senate. First, he argued that the proposal would lead to difficult questions about what
199
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constitutes proprietary trading and what is normal “market making by banks.” In addition,
Corrigan claimed that the risks associated with the ownership of hedge funds and private equity
firms could be “effectively managed and limited by means short of outright prohibition.”203 He
argued that such subsidiaries are essential in creating best practices in new markets, such as
energy, and would too bluntly deal with the conflicts of interest associated with modern
finance.204
The same day, Barry Zubrow of JP Morgan Chase resisted the Volcker Rule. He flatly
claimed that, “the activities the Administration proposes to restrict did not cause the financial
crisis,” and in many cases actually helped financial firms to diversify risk and weather the
economic storm.205 He argued that the current regulatory framework was a sound basis for
controlling proprietary trading risk and that the new regulatory regime should be expanded to
non-deposit holding institutions that are connected with the financial system.206 Zubrow also
strongly criticized the Administration’s proposal to limit the size of financial firms, claiming that
the concentration of institutions had little to do with worsening the crisis and noting that the U.S.
is less concentrated than other highly developed countries.207 In sum, representatives of the
banking industry recognized the need for additional consumer protection, but opposed significant
parts of the CFPB and Volcker Rule.
Financial Services Industry Advocates:
Representatives of financial services were generally complementary when discussing
potential proposals for Dodd-Frank. At a July 2009 hearing in front of the House Finance
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Committee, representatives of the banking and securities industries expressed their opinions on
President Obama’s proposed reform legislation. Richard Baker, the CEO of the Managed Funds
Association, a trade association for hedge funds, began his testimony by emphasizing the small
role that hedge funds played in the Financial Crisis.208 While he agreed to the proposal to require
hedge funds to register with the SEC and the creation of clearinghouses for Over the Counter
(OTC) derivatives, he emphasized the need to allow hedge funds to enter into customized
derivatives contracts. Randolph Snook, the Executive Vice President of the Securities Industry
Financial Markets Association supported many of the policies designed to prevent the buildup of
systemic risk, including the creation of a Financial Services Oversight Council, and the
clearinghouses to regulate OTC derivatives.209 Douglas Lowenstein, the President and CEO of
the Private Equity Council, was largely complementary of the Obama proposal. He supported
many new forms of regulation, but sought an exemption for private equity firms from certain
regulations to prevent systemic risk.210 These witnesses viewed additional regulation as a means
to improve market transparency and efficiency.
On October 7, 2009, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing specifically
on limiting risk in the OTC derivatives market. Scott Sleyster, representing the American
Council of Life Insurers, supported federal regulation of the OTC derivatives market, especially
through a central clearing house for trades. While he had some concerns that certain insurance
products would be misconstrued to apply to derivative regulation, Sleyster was pleased with the
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proposals in the Dodd-Frank draft.211 Like other representatives of the financial services
industry, James Hill of Morgan Stanley and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association spoke highly of the House draft legislation to increase “oversight of the derivatives
markets and the activities of individual market participants.”212 He had relatively minor
concerns with the legislation, mainly concerning the treatment of different types of swaps and
the desire for more authority by the SEC and CFTC.213 Finally, Stuart Kaswell, the General
Counsel for the Managed Funds Association, a trade group for hedge funds, addressed the
committee. Citing the need to prevent another catastrophe like the one that befell AIG and
Lehman Brothers, Kaswell applauded the committee’s work to push sound regulatory reform
legislation. In particular, he praised clearinghouses for OTC derivatives and further regulation of
counterparty risk.214
On December 2, 2009, the Senate Agriculture Committee held a hearing about proposed
legislation to reform regulation of the financial derivatives market. Blythe Masters of JP Morgan
Chase supported the general idea of having OTC derivatives pass through central clearing
houses, but cautioned the Senators that not all OTC market participants would be capable of
going through such institutions and that not all derivatives could be regulated on such exchanges.
She advised the committee to focus more on reducing counterparty exposure to risk than on
simply clearing as many deals as possible.215 In addition, Masters supported requiring markets to
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incorporate more information sharing and the guaranteed right of regulators to attain “any
information at any time and in any form.”
Finally, on September 30, 2009, Bill Himpler of the American Financial Services
Association (AFSA) addressed the House Financial Services Committee on consumer protection
policies in the proposed regulatory reform bill. Himpler supported the idea of greater consumer
protection, but had serious reservations about the nature of the House proposal. First, he
questioned the CFPB’s approach to regulation, claiming that it would “try to fix what is still
working and use a one-size-fits-all approach…to financial service products.”216 For example,
trying to compare terms on a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage to a loan for a washing machine would
be both inflexible and unhelpful. Himpler claimed that the CFPB would lead to a reduction of
credit available to consumers and that the increased regulatory costs associated with the
regulation would be passed on to consumers as a sort of ‘‘tax.’’217 He argued that the CFPB
would ultimately not serve the needs of consumers and that these people would be better served
in an improved version of the current regulatory framework. In sum, members of the financial
services industry were largely supportive of House and Senate financial regulatory reform
proposals for derivatives reform; they were less in favor of existing consumer protection reform
plans.
Consumer Advocates:
Consumer advocates saw financial regulatory reform as an opportunity for important
legislation guaranteeing the rights of consumers to be passed. In particular, they supported the
creation of a consumer financial protection bureau, new regulations to prevent predatory lending,
and whistleblower protections. On September 30, 2009, the House Finance Committee held a
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hearing specifically on the proposed Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Hilary Shelton of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) supported the
creation of the CFPB as a means to help end the targeting of minorities, the elderly, and others
by “unscrupulous lenders” and the underserving of these people by traditional financial firms.218
Shelton blamed inconsistencies in the current set of rules and lax enforcement standards for the
“financial stagnation, and, in too many cases, the economic ruin of people’s lives, families, and
entire communities.”219 She believed that the CFPB would help to prevent many of the abuses
that led to the Financial Crisis and that it would ease the lives of many people who struggle to
deal with financial institutions. Shelton did request that the regulation of the CRA be placed
under the CFPB and that requirements in the CRA be strengthened and expanded.220
Similarly, Michael Calhoun of the Center for Responsible Lending supported the creation
of the CFPB, claiming that, had it existed, it would have prevented many of the worst abuses
prior to the Financial Crisis.221 He blasted federal preemption of state laws aimed to prevent
consumers from being exploited and beseeched Congress not to preempt stronger state laws
when implementing the CFPB. Instead, Calhoun proposed that the CFPB exist in addition to
state consumer protection laws, allowing localities to “detect problems and test solutions.”222
Janis Bowdler of the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) emphasized the importance of new
consumer protections for minorities: “Subprime creditors frequently targeted minority
communities as fertile ground for expansion.”223 She cited a HUD study from 2000, finding that
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low-income black individuals were three times more likely to receive subprime loans than were
white people of similar incomes.224 Bowdler commended the proposal for the CPFB,
particularly the Office for Fair and Equal Opportunity and the draft bill’s refusal to preempt
stronger state laws. She proposed eliminating loopholes for credit unions, real estate brokers,
and auto-lenders and supported bringing the CRA under CPFB jurisdiction.225 Finally, Anna
Burger of the Service Employees International Union testified in favor of consumer protections
in the House draft bill. In particular, Burger commended the presence of whistleblower
protections-- measures that would provide bank employees with a voice in calling attention to
harmful and deceptive practices--in the legislation.226 Thus, consumer advocates strongly
supported measures in Dodd-Frank aimed at protecting consumers and preventing deceptive and
abusive practices.
Discrepancies in House and Senate Forms of Financial Regulatory Reform Legislation
In June of 2009, President Obama released a report detailing his goals for financial
regulatory reform.227 His outline provided an important blueprint for both the House and Senate
versions of Dodd-Frank. Indeed, as he prepared to sign the final legislation, President Obama
remarked that the final agreement “represents 90 percent of what I proposed when I took up this
fight.”228 Financial regulatory reform legislation was introduced into the House on December 2,
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2009.229 It passed on December 11 by the margin of 223-202. No Republicans supported the
bill and 27 Democrats voted against it.230
Following the passage of H.R. 4173 from the House, the Senate received the legislative
baton on financial regulatory reform. On May 20, 2010, the Senate Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs Committee and the entire Senate passed the upper chamber’s version of H.R.
4173. The bill passed by the margin of 59-39, with 56 Democrats in favor and 2 Democrats
voting against. On the Republican side, Senators Brown (R-MA), Snowe (R-ME), and Collins
(R-ME) supported the legislation; Senators Feingod (D-WI) and Cantwell (D-WA) opposed it.231
Much of the legislation is similar to the House and conference reports, though there are some
major differences.
The Senate legislation, unlike the House version, contained a prohibition on proprietary
trading by any insured depositary institution or entity that controls an insured depositary
institution, known as “The Volcker Rule.”232 The existence of this policy in the Senate bill is a
reflection of President Obama’s endorsement of a proprietary trading ban on January 21, after
the passage of the House legislation.233 Unlike the Volcker Rule in the final Dodd-Frank, the
Senate’s legislation included an outright ban on investment banks “sponsoring or investing in
hedge funds or private equity funds,” rather than the partial ban in the final legislation.234
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Senators Merkley (D-OR) and Carl Levin (D-MI) drafted an even stronger version of the
Volcker Rule and were building a coalition of Senators to support it as an amendment to the bill.
However, Republican senators invoked the “unanimous consent” rule, by which all members
would have to agree to bring an amendment to the floor for a vote. After this failure, Merkley
and Levin managed to attach their amendment to an unrelated one by Senator Sam Brownback
(R-KS) that exempted auto-dealers from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. However,
just before the measure came to the floor for a vote, Senator Brownback withdrew his
amendment, killing Merkley-Levin simultaneously.235
Like the House and final bills, the Senate established clearinghouses through which
derivatives had to be cleared. Unlike both the House and conference reports, however, the upper
chamber banned banks from derivatives trading. It voted down an amendment to ban the use of
naked CDS’s (buying a CDS without also owning the underlying CDO).236 Like the other two
bills, the Senate established the CFPB, but did so in a manner more consistent with the final
legislation. Like the conference report, this legislation created the CFPB as a stand-alone body,
independent of the Fed. It also had broader regulatory authority, including over auto-loans, a
provision that was ultimately removed in the conference committee.237 In sections relating to
predatory lending, unlike the Senate and final bills, the House version did not require mortgage
originators to verify that consumers have a “reasonable ability to repay” their loans.238
On the issue of “too big to fail,” the House, Senate, and final bills were largely consistent.
One notable amendment that would have placed a limit on the size of financial institutions failed
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in the Senate.239 Investor protections were also slightly different in the Senate form of the bill,
excluding provisions requiring banks to retain a certain percentage of simple products like
mortgages and inserting language mandating that investment brokers act in the interest of their
clients.240 The Senate bill also contained the “Durbin Amendment,” named after Illinois
Democratic Senator Richard Durbin. This policy was not included in the House bill, but was
maintained in final legislation. The Durbin Amendment gave the Federal Reserve the power to
regulate the fees that credit and debit card issuers charge consumers, requiring that such
transaction fees be “reasonable and proportional to the actual cost incurred by the issuer or
payment card network with respect to the transaction.”241 Finally, Title XI of the House bill was
much more limited in scope than the final bill, not including major restructuring of the Federal
Reserve and failing to create a new Vice Chairman position.242 In sum, despite containing some
different provisions and rules, the House and Senate bills are largely similar, tending to favor
strong regulatory power and consumer interests over the interests of financial services firms.
Conference Committee and The Final Bill
On June 9, 2010, the House rejected the Senate version of financial regulatory reform and
appointed members to a conference committee.243 The Senate version of financial regulatory
reform served as the model for much of the conference committee’s work.244 By June 29, the
conference issued a unified version of Dodd-Frank; it was passed in the House on June 30 by the
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margin of 327-192 and in the Senate on July 15 by the vote of 60-39.245 In the House, three
Republicans voted in favor of the bill and 19 Democrats voted against it; otherwise, this was a
partisan roll call (Democrats voting in favor). On the Senate side, 59 Democrats and Scott
Brown (R-MA) voted for Dodd-Frank and 39 Republicans opposed it.246
Title I of the bill focused on maintaining financial stability and preventing the buildup of
systemic risk. This section created two offices within the Treasury Department: the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and the Office of Financial Research. The Financial
Stability Oversight Council is headed by the Treasury Secretary and consists of the heads of
various regulator agencies, including the Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), and the SEC. This body was required to meet at least four times a year and
was instructed to “identify risks to U.S. financial stability…promote market discipline, by
eliminating expectations on the part of shareholders, creditors, and counterparties of such
companies that the Government will shield them from losses in the event of failure, [and]
respond to emerging threats to the stability of the financial system.”247 The FSOC was given the
power to bring domestic and foreign non-bank financial companies under supervision and
require them to register with the Fed. In addition, it had the authority to collect information from
any state or federal financial regulatory agency and may require any bank or non-bank financial
institution with assets in excess of $50 billion to submit reports on its financial condition, risk
management practices, and transactions. Moreover, it had the power to take actions to mitigate
risk among such large institutions, including ordering them to terminate activities, restrict the
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sale or use of financial products, or order them to move assets to an unaffiliated entity.248 The
Office of Financial Research was tasked with supporting the FSOC and subpoena power over
any financial institution.249 Other important rules in Title I include subjecting non-bank financial
companies supervised by the Fed to the same enforcement procedures in the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act to which banks are subjected, giving the Fed the power to order stress tests, and
requiring large institutions to minimize credit exposures to the failure of one institution to 25%
of the company’s stock.250
Title II detailed the process by which financial entities may be liquidated in an orderly
fashion. Dodd-Frank allowed the FDIC and Securities Investor Protection Corporation to
liquidate insurance companies and non-bank financial institutions if they meet the legal standards
for such action, subject to appeal by a bank’s board to federal district court.251 This section of
the legislation was meant to minimize the possibility of future bailouts of financial institutions.
Title III abolished the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), splitting the agency’s duties and
power among other regulators. In particular, the OCC received the power to regulate federal
savings associations and was given chief rule-making power over these organizations. The
legislation provided the Fed with significant power in the interim between the abolition of the
OTC and when the OCC would assume control. Finally, Dodd-Frank replaced the OTC
Director’s place on the FDIC board with the head of the new Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau.252
Title IV, also known as the “Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of
2010,” introduced significant regulation over hedge funds. The act required hedge funds to keep
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certain records, including the amount of assets under management, leverage, and counterparty
exposure and to provide these records to the SEC if the agency makes a reasonable request for
them.253 Interestingly, these regulations of hedge funds came even as most observers agreed that
such financial institutions had little to do with causing the financial crisis.254 Title V, containing
the “Federal Insurance Office Act of 2010,” created the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within
the Treasury. This office was ordered to “monitor the insurance industry, identify issues or gaps
in the regulation of insurers that could contribute to a systemic crisis in the insurance industry or
the U.S. financial system, [and] monitor the extent to which traditionally underserved
communities and consumers, minorities, and low- and moderate-income persons have access to
affordable insurance products.”255 The FIO was given subpoena power and the authority to
enforce regulations. This portion of Dodd-Frank is explicitly pro-consumer in its emphasis on
the rights and interests of underserved communities.
Title VI is also known as the "Bank and Savings Association Holding Company and
Depository Institution Regulatory Improvements Act of 2010.” It contained the important and
controversial measure known as the Volcker Rule. Named for former Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Paul Volcker, the Volcker rule banned banking entities from engaging in proprietary
trading and from owning more than 3% of any hedge fund or private equity firm.256
Additionally, Section 621 contained a conflict of interest provision banning banks from engaging
in any deal that would produce a conflict of interest with their clients. The 3% allowance was
weaker than the original Senate version of the policy, which issued a blanket ban. This policy
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was designed, in part, to prevent some of the conflicts of interest that had developed in the leadup to the Financial Crisis. In many cases, investment banks secretly took the short side of deals
on which their clients went long. In the famous Abacus Deals, Goldman Sachs packaged risky
mortgage-backed securities into synthetic CDO’s and sold them to investors while it took the
short side of the deal. When many of these securities became worthless in the wake of rising
foreclosures, Goldman reaped billions in profits while its investors lost considerable sums.257
The legislation ordered the CFTC and SEC to develop the exact regulatory framework that will
be used to enforce the Volcker Rule.258 This regulation is quite controversial, as it greatly
curtails a significant stream of revenue for investment banks. However, the degree to which
financial services interests are able to influence the result of this legislation will become clearer
when the SEC and CFTC fill in the remaining gaps in the bill.
Title VII of Dodd-Frank, the “Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010,”
concerned itself with the regulation of financial derivatives.259 This is an extremely important
portion of the bill, as it overturned much of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000,
expanding the regulatory power of the CFTC and SEC vis-à-vis the securities industry.260
Section 712 granted regulatory oversight responsibility for swaps to the CFTC and for securitybased swaps to the SEC. Derivatives that are a mixture between these two types of swaps were
regulated by both agencies.261 This portion of Dodd-Frank also contained language explicitly
banning the use of taxpayer funds to bail out swaps institutions that need funds as a result of their
derivative trading activities.262 Section 748 contained the consumer-friendly provisions of a
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CFTC Consumer Protection Fund to reward whistleblowers and finance education programs so
that consumers can spot violations of securities law.263 Section 763 created “a clearing agency to
submit and the SEC to review each security-based swap…to determine whether it should be
required to be cleared.”264 For the first time, “Over the Counter” (OTC) swaps would be cleared
through exchanges. Importantly, many of the rules in this section were not enumerated in the
act and were left to the discretion of relevant agencies, providing business groups with an
opportunity to bend the regulatory regime to their wills.265
Title VIII of the bill, called the “Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of
2010,” sought to reduce the likelihood of systemic risk by ordering the Fed to prescribe risk
management standards and giving it the power to request risk information from member
companies.266 Title IX, the “Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010,” created
the Investor Advisory Committee within the SEC to advise the agency on, among other things,
“initiatives to protect investor interest [and] initiatives to promote investor confidence and the
integrity of the securities marketplace.”267 Section 922 authorized the creation of a
whistleblower bounty program, by which any person who provides original information that
leads to a successful SEC enforcement resulting in sanctions of $1 million or more is entitled to
between 10% and 30% of sanctions collected.268 Subtitle C concerned itself with the regulation
of the credit ratings agencies, increasing regulation of nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations (NRSRO’s) via the newly created Office of Credit Ratings in the SEC.269 Subtitle
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D augmented regulation of asset-backed securities, requiring mortgage securitizers to hold a
minimum percentage of the security on its books, among other requirements.270
Title X, also known as the “Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010,” was one of the
highest-profile portions of Dodd-Frank. This portion of the legislation created the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, housed within the Federal Reserve System. Section 1021 assigned
the bureau the following mission: to “implement and enforce federal consumer financial law to
ensure that all consumers have access to fair, transparent, and competitive markets for consumer
financial products and services.”271 The bureau was supposed to watch for risks to consumers
posed by financial products or services. Under Subtitle C, the CFPB was provided the authority
to ban “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in connection with any transaction with a
consumer for, or the offering of, a consumer financial product or service; and (2) promulgate
regulations to prevent such practices.”272 In addition, it was tasked with ensuring that
consumers are provided proper disclosure about the nature and risks associated with financial
products and services. Finally, Subtitle E granted the CFPB the enforcement powers to
investigate, adjudicate, and litigate potential offenders.273
Title XI concerned the Federal Reserve System and amended the Federal Reserve Act.
Section 1102 granted the Comptroller General the authority to audit the Fed and Section 1108
created a second Vice Chairman position.274 Title XII attempts to expand access to the financial
system by encouraging people of low and moderate incomes to participate in mainstream
finance. It established programs for these individuals to open accounts at FDIC insured
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depositary institutions and provided funding for financial literacy programs.275 Section XIII, the
“Pay it Back Act of 2010,” related to TARP. This portion of the legislation reduced the amount
of money the Treasury is allowed to spend on troubled assets by more than $200 billion and
required biannual reports from the Treasury Secretary to Congress on the status of TARP.276
Title XIV, the “Mortgage Reform and Ant-Predatory Lending Act,” is one of the most
important consumer protection sections in Dodd-Frank. Four of the subtitles--A, B, C, and E-serve as “enumerated consumer law” to be administered by the CFPB.277 Section 1403 banned
all forms of compensation for mortgage originators that vary based on any terms other than the
amount of principal. In addition, it prohibited a mortgage originator from predatory lending
practices such as steering a consumer to purchase a loan he or she is not reasonably able to
repay; steering a qualified consumer into an unqualified loan; administering variable lending
practices among consumers with equal credit that are based on age, race, ethnicity, or gender;
and mischaracterizing a consumer’s credit history to qualify for a loan.278 These measures were
intended to end many of the predatory lending practices that grew and perpetuated the housing
bubble and therein led to spikes in foreclosures. Subtitle B established minimum lending
standards for issuing mortgages. Moreover, Section 1413 allowed consumers facing foreclosure
to use as a defense the fact that the mortgage creditor either steered the consumer into bad loan
terms or did not conduct due diligence on his or her ability to repay.279 Title XIV also established
tougher regulations for high-cost mortgages and created an office of Housing Counseling.
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Finally, Subtitle F established more stringent guidelines for the appraisal process, requiring
multiple physical visits for high-risk mortgages.280
Conclusion and Considerations
Dodd-Frank demonstrates significant consumer protection and additional regulation on
the banking, insurance, and financial services industries. At face value, this legislation seems to
be pro-consumer and largely impervious to business interest group positions. Policies such as
the creation of the Federal Insurance Office and Titles IX, X, XII, and XIV were significant proconsumer measures. Dodd-Frank contains numerous new rules, regulatory responsibilities, and
sources of agency authority. The fact that the bill remained strong in regulating business
throughout the legislative process hints at less than absolute influence by financial interest
groups. Indeed, some important rules, such as the Volcker Rule, were actually added later in the
process.
However, the legislation is not nearly as “anti-business” as it might appear. Business
groups were quite successful in ensuring that the task of writing of many of the rules was given
to regulatory agencies. This gives interest groups the opportunity to lobby for favorable
regulations while outside of the public eye. Even when regulations are fully recorded, they will
only be as strong as the wills of the regulators. Indeed, “it was often said in the aftermath of the
crisis that agencies like the Fed and the SEC and the OCC had plenty of tools to curb the abuses
that were taking place in the banking system. They just lacked the will.”281 History will
ultimately record whether these Dodd-Frank regulations have a real effect on preventing future
financial crises. In addition, banking advocates succeeded in weakening the Volcker rule in the
conference report, garnering banks the right to have a limited stake in hedge funds and private
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equity firms. Banking advocates also succeeded in defeating an Administration proposal to limit
the size of financial firms. Finally, one must consider the fact that business groups supported
certain pro-consumer parts of the legislation. For example, the financial services industry
backed derivatives clearinghouses and further investor protections. Provisions that may appear
to be pro-consumer at the expense of business might well be supported by industry advocates.
When assessing the relative degrees of influence within the legislative process between
business groups and consumer advocates, it is important to consider both the makeup of
Congress and the larger political trends. In the wake of the Financial Crisis, regulatory reform
was almost inevitable, putting financial services advocates at a disadvantage and consumer
advocates in better position. After the near collapse of the financial system, business groups had
less clout, both in the media and among members of Congress. In addition, the strong
Democratic majorities in both chambers of Congress made life more difficult for industry
advocates, as many of these members were more pre-disposed to the interests of consumer
advocates and potentially hostile to the financial sector. Democrats tend to be more amenable to
the interests of consumers than they are to those of big business, so odds were further stacked
against financial services industry lobbyists.
Finally, it is important to consider the impact of the Obama Administration in the shaping
of Dodd-Frank. The President’s early draft had a powerful effect in influencing the overall
structure of this legislation, making significant changes more challenging for industry groups to
secure. With the Administration’s stance often very clear (and the President’s power to veto),
writers of the bills were likely more cautious in making sweeping alterations. Also, when it is
considered as a consumer advocate group, the Obama Administration greatly amplified the
relative power of consumer groups in relation to businesses. In sum, Dodd-Frank is largely

Silverman
inconclusive on the relative power of interest groups. Given the very anti-Wall Street climate,
large Democratic majorities, and a Democratic President, odds were stacked against corporate
interest groups. Once all of the unwritten rules are enumerated, it will be easier to assess the
relative and absolute power of business groups and consumer advocates with regards to DoddFrank.
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Conclusion

Through case studies of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley and Dodd-Frank Acts, this thesis has
sought to determine the extent to which corporate interests influence the lawmaking process in
absolute and relative terms vis-à-vis their adversaries. The dominant view in social science
research is that business organizations have the upper hand in legislative influence. They deftly
utilize the tools of campaign finance and lobbying to achieve their policy goals. The case studies
of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and Dodd-Frank demonstrate mixed findings with regards to the
influence of business groups and consumer advocates. On the one hand, Gramm-Leach-Bliley
represented the culmination of more than a decade of lobbying pressure by the banking and
financial services industries. However, the bill established robust consumer privacy standards
and maintained the CRA. Meanwhile, Dodd-Frank appears on the surface to be very proconsumer at the expense of business. However, many unwritten rules may ultimately favor the
banking and financial services industries. In addition, business groups were often in support of
certain regulations in the bill, stances that yield little information about their relative and
absolute influence. Finally, business groups succeeded in weakening the Volcker rule and
several other proposed policies prior to the passage of the final bill.
In general, it is clear that business interest groups have significant legislative influence in
both an absolute and a relative sense. When considering these cases, one gets the sense that,
while Madison’s view of American interest group politics is not dead, neither is it thriving. Still,
business organizations do not have hegemonic control over the legislative process. Consumer
advocates, especially when backed with a Democratic presidential administration, clearly have
the strength to achieve their policy ends. In general, this thesis shows the importance of
considering the external political environment in which a bill is written: the relative and absolute
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strength of interest groups is highly dependent on the environment, as seen in the case of DoddFrank. Therefore, the case studies in this thesis demonstrate the high absolute and relative
strength of business interest groups, subject to constraints by the external political environment.
Suggestions for Further Research
Going forward, more research could be conducted on financial services legislation,
particularly to determine the effect of the partisan composition of Congress and the Presidency.
Case studies should be conducted on bills passed under a Republican president and both
Democratic and Republican Congresses. In addition, a study could be conducted comparing
members’ voting habits over time in relation to varying amounts of PAC money or lobbying time
they receive from business and consumer/public interest groups. Research could analyze the
relative and absolute power of business organizations and consumer advocates in interactions
with the federal bureaucracy. Future studies could incorporate more interviews with
policymakers and lobbyists in order to better understand the decision processes behind the
policies incorporated in bills. Finally, there should be research on specific issue areas on which
business and consumer advocates, respectively, have clear and opposing viewpoints. Such
legislation includes recent bills relating to credit cards, bankruptcy, and mortgage origination.
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